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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America

AWARD
Case #M-318-89

and
American Airlines

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Adjustment,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, make the following AWARD:
The discharge of Evelis Brandon is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall be
reinstated, but without back pay.

DATED: July 23, 1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric /$ . Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J Schmertz do hereby a f f i r m upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual d e s c r i b e d in and^wtio executed
igjfat^UtsU^AS^
this instrument which is my AWARD.

DATED: July
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990
' ss

DATED: July
1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF
)°

Anthony J. Gaudioso
Concurring
Dissenting

Judith A. Shire
Concurring
Dissenting

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America

CHAIRMAN'S OPINION
Case #M-318~89

and
American Airlines

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Evelis Brandon?
If not, what should be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 18, 1990 at which time Mr.
Brandon, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared. Ms.
Judith A. Shire and Mr. Anthony J. Gaudioso served, respectively,
as the Company and Union members of the Board of Adjustment, and
the Undersigned served as Chairman. The Oath of the Board was
waived. A stenographic record of the hearing was taken. All
concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
met in executive session on July 10, 1990.

The Board

The evidentiary question is whether the Company has met its
burden of proof by showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the grievant committed an unprovoked assault on Crew Chief Frank
DiMarco by grabbing DiMarco, pushing him back into another piece
of equipment and punching him in the lip.
DiMarco's testimoney supports the charge. He asserts that
he was giving the grievant routine instructions for unloading a
plane's baggage, when the grievant first yelled and screamed at
him, said "let's go" (which DiMarco interpreted to mean that the
grievant wanted to fight); and then after parking his tractor, got
off it and came at him, grabbed his shirt near the neck and
throat and pushed him backwards against a stationary cochran. And
that after they were separated, DiMarco felt a blow to his lip,

-2which because the grievant was the one in close proximity, he
believes the grievant inflicted.

There is no dispute that

DiMarco suffered a cut or bruised lip.
Admitting he "grabbed" DiMarco, the grievant denies he
struck him on the lip. He asserts that DiMarco insulted him and
provoked him to anger by calling him "dick" and "dickhead" as
DiMarco gave orders for the plane's unloading.
In determining what happened, I do not consider the testimony of Raven Chaney to be reliable. Nor do I consider the testimony of Ralston Headley to be accurate or complete.

The testimony

of the other witnesses, either because they did not see the incident or did not see it in its entirely, cannot be determinative.
Chaney was ostensibly a fleet service clerk, but in reality, he
was an undercover agent investigating drug trafficking and/or
use among employees. His first written report of the altercation
between the grievant and DiMarco was false, by his own admission.
That report did not fix responsibility for the altercation nor
support the elements of the charge.

His second written report

followed the grievant's dismissal, and it, together with his testimony at the hearing, support the charges against DiMarco. Chaney'j
explanation for his first, "false" report, namely that he didn't
want to prejudice his position among the employees or presumably
"blow his cover," I consider dubious.

Though an accurate and full

report of the incident may have damaged his relationships with the
employees, I think, to accept him as a truthful and credible
witness he had a duty, especially as an undercover agent, to
report events truthfully and completely, regardless of the consequences.

Not to do so taints his general credibility and would

have tainted it in any subsequent testimony regarding drug use or
trafficking. So, in my view, to maintain "his cover" is not an
acceptable explanation from a professional investigator whose
duty and credibility require something different. Also, I do not
think it unreasonable, in his zealousness to maintain his under-

-3cover employment that he might enthusiastically support the
Company's charges against the grievant by "seeing" what he believed the Company would have liked him to see. It should be
noted, significantly, that Chaney reported that the grievant
struck DiMarco on the lip with two blows at two different times.
Yet DiMarco reports only one blow.

So, in short, I am uneasy

with Chaney's testimony, and as it is the only direct evidence
linking the grievant to DiMarco's lip injury, I cannot accept it
as the critical testimony which would support all the elements of
the charge and hence be the basis for upholding the discharge.
Headley's testimony is equally unreliable.

He broke up the

altercation. I think he knows more about the blow to DiMarco's
lip than he acknowledges. He denies that he saw the grievant do
it, advancing instead the possibility that he (Headley) may have
accidently struck DiMarco on the lip when he separated the two
men. That testimony is not convincing. His description of how
he separated them (and the traditional methods of doing so) do
not lend themselves to the probability of an accidental blow to
the lip. Had he bruised DiMarco's lip while separating the two
men, I am convinced that he and DiMarco would have known it and
reacted differently.
This is not a criminal case.

Here, the civil, rather than

criminal standards of proof apply. Circumstantial evidence, logic
and reasonable conclusions are adequate in disciplinary cases, to
meet the standard of clear and convincing.

Therefore, the case

narrows to the testimonies of the grievant and DiMarco.

Both have

something to gain from picturing themselves in the best light.
The grievant seeks to overturn his discharge. DiMarco seeks to
be viewed as an innocent victim, who did not provoke the confrontation .
Based on their respective testimonies, the other circumstantial evidence and rational analysis, I have concluded that
the following happened.

The grievant did advance on DiMarco; did

-4exhibit anger towards him; did grab him and push him backwards;
and, because there was motive and compelling probability, did hit
DiMarco on the lip.

But, again, logic, circumstances and ration-

ality lead me to disbelieve that this occurred only because DiMarco
ordered the grievant to first remove empty cartons from the plane
(and place them on the ground) and then unload the baggage. And/
or that it occurred because DiMarco called the grievant or got
his attention with the word or sound "yo." There is no evidence of
earlier "bad blood" between them or earlier confrontations. There
had to be something more to cause the grievant to first show anger
by language; then to park his tractor and return to confront and
grab DiMarco.

That something had to be provocative - in the nature

of a real or perceived insult. Indeed, the events do not hold to-!
gether and cannot be adequately explained without it. Consequent!^,
I conclude that the grievant may very well be telling the truth
when he claims that DiMarco, in giving unloading orders, called
him a "dick" and "dick-head."
In that setting where the grievant, improperly I believe,
resented and even resisted removing empty cartons before the
baggage, the appellation "dick" or "dick-head" is insulting and
provocative and could well trigger a physical assault. That the
1 grievant did not make this claim as defense at his
insurance hearing is troublesome.

unemployment

Yet, that proceeding is diff-

erent than an arbitration. I do not know if the grievant and his
representative knew or thought that his unemployment claim would
be contested by the Company and therefore what magnitude of defense
was necessary.
However, on balance, and in short, the Unemployment Insurance
case notwithstanding, I am persuaded that there had to be some
triggering event to set the grievant off to attack DiMarco, and
my conclusion in that regard and the evidence supporting it in
this record simply preempts the omission from the Unemployment
Insurance record.

-5Of course, this is not to excuse the grievant. He should hav
carried out DiMarco's orders without resistance or complaint.
he done so the event might not have taken place.

Had

And even if or

when called an insulting name, his proper response was to do the
job as ordered and complain to his Union about DiMarco's name
calling. At best, the provocation is therefore only a mitigating
factor. Discipline is clearly warranted.
The assault was serious
and dangerous. Even after separated the grievant continued the
attack with a blow to DiMarco's lip. This type of response and
conduct cannot be tolerated, especially when alternative remedies
are available through Union representation and the grievance procedure. But, under the particular circumstances of this case,
discipline short of discharge is warranted and appropriate. The
discharge shall be reduced to a disciplinary suspension for the
period of time the grievant has been out.

I find no significance

to and therefore reject the Union's claim that the Company relied
on the wrong work rule in effectuating discipline.

DATED: July 23, 1990

Eric/J. Schmertz
Cha/lrman

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. - TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America
and

A W A R D
Case No. M-348~87-Green

American Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
The discharge of Frank Green was for
just cause.
The Union's argument regarding the
application of Article 28(d) to the
manner in which the Company issued
and applied the first and second
step and final advisories, has not
been shown unambiguously to be within our jurisdiction and therefore
has not been considered substantively.
However the rights of the parties on
that question and in that regard are
expressly reserved and unprejudiced
for future matters.

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee
DATED: January 10, 1990
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-2-

Judith A. Shire
Concurring
DATED: January
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990
' ss

I, Judith A. Shire do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument , which is my AWARD.

Anthony Gaudioso
Dissenting
DATED: January
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990

>„

I, Anthony Gaudioso do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. - TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America

Opinion of Neutral Referee
Case No. M-348~87-Green

and
American Airlines, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Frank Green. If not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on November 17, 1989 at which time Mr.
Green, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The System
Board of Adjustment had as its members, Mr. Anthony Gaudioso,
the Union's designee, Ms, Judith A.. Shire, The Company's designee
and the Undersigned, as Neutral Referee. The Board's Oath was
waived. A stenographic record of the hearing was taken. The
Board met in executive session on December 18, 1989.
The grievant was discharged for an unsatisfactory attendance record, in accordance with the Company's attendance control
policy.
There is no dispute between the parties over the unsatisfactory nature of the grievant's attendance record.

That record

has been documented in this proceeding and is unrefuted. Indeed,
one of the well settled principles of arbitral law is recognized,
and that is that chronic poor attendance need not be tolerated by
an employer regardless of the reasons and explanations for the
absenteeism, and even if it is beyond the fault and control of
the affected employee. Therefore, the grievant's transportation
problems, personal difficulties, oversleeping, medical conditions
and other offered explanations are immaterial in the face of a

conceded excessive record of chronic absenteeism over a measuring
period of the last two years.
What is in dispute, and what constitutes the Union's basic
argument against the terminal penalty of discharge, is the two
year "statute of limitation" set forth in Article 28(d) of the
contract.

Said Section reads:
All letters of discipline (warning or suspension) will be removed after a period of
two (2) years from date of issuance.
It is the Union's contention that because more than two years
elapsed between the grievant's first step "advisory" warning him
of his poor attendance and his final "advisory" that triggered

his discharge, the first advisory should have been expunged from
his record; the second and final advisors should not have referred
to or been built on the first advisory; and the final advisory
and dismissal were procedurally premature.

Under the Union's

assertion, once the two years had elapsed, the required removal
of the first step advisory would constructively transform the
second advisory into a new first advisory and that therefore an
immediately subsequent "final advisory" would not sequentially
follow.
The grievant received a first step advisory on August 1,
1985. He received a second step advisory on October 1, 1986 and
a final advisory (and discharge) on August 13, 1987.
While recognizing that slightly more than two calendar years
had passed between the first step advisory and the final advisory,
the Company interprets Article 28(d)

differently.

It contends

that once a subsequent advisory has been issued and provided at
that time its reference to and inclusion of an early advisory is
still timely and within the two year period, that subsequent
advisory (in this case the second step advisory) stands on its own
as a step in progressive discipline and the reference to a first
step advisory need not be expunged when and if because of the
later passage of two years, the first step advisory is removed
from an employee's record.

To do otherwise, argues the Company

_ o_

is to negate the application of progressive discipline.

Further-

more, the Company points out that the time facts in this case are
not new to the parties; that many other discipline cases have been
similar; that the Union in those prior cases never raised a question over the effect on the second step advisory or the final advisory when a first step advisory is removed after two years, and
never objected to the Company's practice of administering the
absentee control policy and the time sequence of the advisories
as it did in this case.
It is unclear to the Neutral Referee whether he and this
System Board has jurisdiction or authority to resolve the foregoing procedural dispute.

This System Board is one of six Area

Boards of Adjustment. It is contractually distinguished from a
System General Board of Adjustment and a System Divisional Board
of Adjustment. The Attendance control Policy is a Company "rule."
Its progressive Three Step advisory procedure constitutes the
implementation of that rule.

Whether the Union is correct in its

interpretation of the effect of Article 28(d)

in the Three Step

procedure, or the Company is correct in its application of its
rule in the face of Article 28(d) may be either a dispute "involving the interpretation or application of (the) Agreement within the Board's jurisdiction under Article 32, or contrarywise a
"dispute relating to... rules..." which Article 32 expressly bars
from the jurisdiction of the System Boards.

Therefore this

Board's jurisdiction, if not questionable is certainly ambiguous.
And that ambiguity has not been resolved or clarified by the recorji
before us.
Additionally, the authority of the System General Board of
Adjustment is to "hear and determine all disputes properly before
it which are not within the jurisdiction of the Divisional or Area
Boards..." It is clear that the authority of a Divisional Board
is limited to "overtime and other rate of pay grievances" (Division Board I) and to "scope, work assignment and seniority grievance cases" (Division Board II) and therefore not over other contract issues.

Hence, in the absence of clear authority within the

-4Area Boards to deal with the instant issue as a contract interpretation arising out of a discharge (and I have held that this
Area Board's authority is at best ambiguous) it may fall within
the authority of the System General Board.
Let me be clear. Because of the foregoing ambiguity and
lack of clarity as to authority I make no determination on this
procedural question. I do not decide whether it is an issue of
contract interpretation or a matter of a "rule." I make no determination of whether or which System Board has jurisdiction.

I

expressly reserve the rights of the Union and the Company on these
matters, to be raised and argued again, if appropriate, at another
time and in another proceeding.
What I do decide is that that issue, as the Union's basic
defense in this case, has not been shown by the Union to be unquestionably within our jurisdiction for this Board to give it
consideration.

Therefore, it is not and shall not be considered

in this particular arbitration case, with the rights of the parti
unprejudiced and expressly reserved for future matters.
Consequently, left in this case, are only the grievant's
unsatisfactory attendance record over an extended period of time,
and the substantive evidence of counseling, warnings and final
discharge.

Under that circumstance, I have no choice but to up-

hold the grievant's dismissal.

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee
DATED: January 10, 1990

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. - TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America, Local 501

A W A R D
Case No. M-429-

and
American Airlines, Inc.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following
AWARD:
Because of uneven application of discipline,
the discharge of Ronald Altomare is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. He shall be
reinstated, but without back pay and the period of time between his discharge and reinstatement shall be deemed the disciplinary
suspension for violations of Rules 3, 4, 5,
and 34.

DATED: January 18, 1990
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: January
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990
Anthony Gaudioso
Concurring

I, Anthony Gaudioso do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

-2-

DATED: January
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1990

Judith A. Shire
Dissenting

I, Judith A. Shire do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. - TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA
SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union
of America, Local 501

OPINION of NEUTRAL REFEREE
CASE NO. M-429-88

and
American Airlines, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was Ronald Altoma.re discharged for just cause,
and if not, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on June 20 and September 19, 1989, at
which time Mr. Altomare, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company
appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The tripartite System Board of Adjustment consisted of Mr. Anthony
Gaudioso, the Union's designee; Ms. Judith A. Shire, The Company's
designee and the Undersigned as Neutral Referee.

The Oath of the

Board was waived; a stenographic record of the proceedings was
taken, and each side filed a post hearing brief. The Board met
in executive session on December 18, 1989.
The grievant is charged with various rule violations (Rule
#3, 4, 5) relating to being away from his work place and off the
Company property without permission during regular working hours.
Though violations of these rules may result in discipline, the
penalty of discharge was imposed on the grievant because of a
specific violation of another Rule - Rule 34. That Rule reads:
Dishonesty of any kind in relations with the
Company, such as theft or pilferage of Company
property, the property of other employees or
property of others entrusted to the Company,
or misrepresentation in obtaining employee benefits or privileges will be grounds for dismissal
and where the facts warrant, prosecution to the
fullest extent of the law. Comployees charged
with a criminal offense on or off duty may be

-2-

immediately withheld from service. Any
action constituting a criminal offense,
whether committed on duty or off duty,
will be grounds for dismissal.
He is accused of arranging or permitting his time card to
be punched out at the end of his shift by other employees when
he had not returned to and was not on the Company premises at the
time. The alleged "dishonesty" is the fraud involved in that
arrangement and the claim or taking of pay (based on the time
card record) for time not worked.
It is undisputed that under Rule 34 both the employee whose
card is so punched and the employee who punches it for him have
committed Rule 34 violations and are equally subject to discharge.
Apparently, however, if the employee whose card is punched by another is on the premises at the time, or if it cannot be determined that he is away, the penalty of summary discharge is not
imposed.
And herein lies the defect with the Company's case in this
proceeding.
The Company has proved to my satisfaction (primarily by the
evidence and testimony of the surveillance of the grievant) that
the grievant left the plant on several different days, ostensibly
to take a late lunch; visited a video store and his home; and remained out of the plant for a period of time significantly beyond
the contractually allowed meal period. That testimony and evidence are entirely credible and stand unrefuted.

Also, though I

think supervision was lax, acquiescent and possibly negligent in
not preventing this, I am not persuaded that the grievant obtained
permission or authorization to remain out of and off the premises
for those extended periods of time.
By adequate circumstantial evidence (which can prove a
disciplinary charge in an arbitration) I am satisfied that on
those occasions the grievant did not return to the property and

-3-

was not on the premises at the end of his shift.
shows that he was not seen returning

The evidence

to his job or to the property

and that he could not be located at work or on the property at
that critical time when supervision actively looked for him.

He

was not seen, directly (or on film when a hidden camera was used)
at or around the time clock at punch out time.

Though the sur-

veillance of him off premises was discontinued before the time of
punch out, that discontinuance was late in or near the end of his
shift. And though his actual whereabouts after that point has not
been precisely determined, I conclude that considering the late
hour and the fact that he had by then been off the property well
beyond the allowed meal period, he did not return to his work
station or to the property.
The convincing evidence in this regard is the undisputed
fact, established again by surveillance/ that other employees, who
were both identified and not identified in the record, punched
him out. I conclude he arranged that that be done and I reject
his one explanation that he thought he forgot to punch out and
after leaving at punch out time called back into the office and
asked someone else to punch him out if he had not done so.

I

simply do not believe that explanation in the face of substantial
contrary evidence.
The film surveillance of the time clock showed that the
grievant's time card was punched out on three occasions by employe
Burns and Jakubiel.

Yet, Burns and Jakubiel were not discharged

because, the Company explains, it could not establish that on thos
occasions the grievant was not on the premises. The Company
distinguishes between the days that surveillance of the grievant
was maintained, asserting that on those days he did not return to
the property, and the three times his card was punched out by Burn:
and Jakubiel, when the grievant's absence from the property could
not be determined.

Frankly I do not see the distinction.

The

-4-

Company alleges that on the days of surveillance off the property,
the grievant did not return at punch out time, though his card
was punched. Implicit in that allegation is that someone else
punched the grievant's card for him, when he was off the premises,
though there is no direct evidence of his absence on those occasions.

When the Company finally saw (from the films) that Burns

and Jakubiel punched the grievant's card on three other days, it
should have, in my view, reached the same conclusion, namely that
by pre-arrangement other employees punched the grievant out at
the end of the shift when there was no more (or less) evidence as
to the grievant's whereabouts at the time.

In my judgment, when

the Company concluded that the grievant did not return to the
property on the days he was observed off the premises and that
on those days some other non-identified employee(s) punched his
card for him, it should have concluded similarly when it finally
saw on three other occasions, that the grievant's card was punched
out by Burns and Jakubiel. In short, the same circumstantial
evidence supportive of the Company's factual allegations in this
case were present in both circumstances. I do not find the distinction made by the Company to be a difference justifying different penalties for the grievant on one hand and Burns and Jakubiel
on the other.
Put another way, I find that both the grievant and Burns and
Jakubiel committed Rule 34 violations of equal egregiousness.
Under the well settled rule that discipline must be equally and
evenhandedly imposed on all employees similarly situated, the
grievant, Burns and Jakubiel should have been dealt with the same
way.
The Company did not treat them similarly because it reached
different conclusions about the grievant's whereabouts at punch
out time.

But I find those conclusions

indistinguishable.

inconsistent and factuall

On all occasions that the grievant's card was

punched out by other employees, there is the same quantum of
evidence that he was not on the premises.

— 5—
Frankly, in the application of discipline, the Company cannot have it both ways.

It cannot base the grievant's dismissal

on a set of facts which it then does not apply to Burns and
Jakubiel, when both circumstances arose out of a course or pattern
of conduct and the "same transaction."
As I see it, with no more direct evidence on any occasion
that the grievant had or had not returned to the premises, the
Company, to satisfy the disciplinary rule, had the duty to make
the same decision about Burns and Jakubiel as it did about the
grievant.

If it concluded that the grievant was off premises on

certain days when others punched his card, it had no acceptable
evidentiary reason to conclude otherwise or equivocate, on the
three occasions it saw Burns and Jakubiel punch his card.
If the grievant's discharge was based on circumstantial facts
subject to a test of those facts in this arbitration, to be evenhanded, the Company should have discharged Burns and Jakubiel and
subjected those discharges to the same arbitral test. To do other-wise is disparate treatment.
Of course, the grievant cannot be excused. But for my finding of unequal treatment, I would have sustained his discharge.
Therefore, though I shall reverse his discharge and direct his reinstatement, it shall be, in accordance with the Board's remedial
powers, without back pay. And the period of time from his discharge
to his reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension for
the rule violations he committed.

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee
DATED: January 18, 1990

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Boston Globe Employee Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130-0576-87

and
The Boston Globe Newspaper Company
The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the grievance numbered 87~01, involving William Boles?
Hearings were held at the American Arbitration Association
in Boston, Massachusetts on June 21 and September 18, 1989, at
which time Mr. Boles, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was
taken; and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
In pertinent part, Grievance 87-01 reads:
Job Title: Assistant Librarian
Complaint: That Bill Boles through no fault
of his own has lost wages and
promotion.
Violation(s): Art. II, Para. 2, Pge. 3; Art.
II, Para. 8G and 8H, Pge. 11, and
any other applicable paragraphs
or provisions.
What Settlement is Expected: That Bill Boles
be made whole.
At the hearing the parties entered into the following Joint
Stipulation of Facts:
1. The parties to this arbitration are the Boston
Globe Newspaper Company (the "Company") and the
Boston Globe Employees Association (the "Union").
The Company is a Massachusetts corporation with
its principal place of business in Boston,
Massachusetts, and is engaged in the publication

-2of a daily newspaper. The Union, which is
unaffiliated, represents a bargaining unit
of approximately 1200 employees in the editorial, commercial, circulation, advertising and building maintenance department.
2. The collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the Union which governs
this grievance was in effect from July 1,
1989 through June 30, 1987 (the "Agreement").
Jt. Ex. 1. The current collective bargaining
agreement between the Company and the Union
is in effect from July 1, 1987 through December
31, 1990.
3. The grievant, William Boles, has been employed by the Company since 1970. His job
and salary history is attached as Joint Exhibit 2.
4. On and after July 18, 1985, the Company
posted an opening for the position of Assistant Librarian. Jt. Ex. 3.
5. Mr. Boles was selected for the position of
Assistant Librarian on September 30, 1985 at a
weekly salary of $717.25.
6. Prior to that, he held the position of Library Associate at a weekly salary of $613.25.
7. On October 2, 1985, the Union filed a grievance. Jt. Ex. 4.
8. The grievance was heard by Arbitrator Arthur
Stark on May 30, September 9 and 10, 1986.
9. The parties' post-hearing briefs are attached
as Joint exhibits 5 and 6.
10. On December 8, 1986, Arbitrator Stark
issued his Opinion and Award. Jt. Ex. 7.
11. On January 9, 1987, the Company placed Ms.
Rollins in the Assistant Librarian position,
with commensurate back pay. Jt. Ex. 7A.
12. On January 18, 1987, the Company returned
Mr. Boles to his former Library Associate position. Mr. Boles' pay was reduced by $116.00
per week to the rate established in Article
VI of the Agreement for the Library Associate

-3job classification for his seniority. Jt.
Ex. 8.
13. The Company gave Mr. Boles a merit increase of $58 per week. Jt. Ex. 9. The
current contract rate for his position is
$723.25. He is being paid $809.03. (A
combination of previously held merit pay
of $19, the new merit increase of $58 and
the application of the contractual general
percent increases to the combined merit pay)
14. On January 9, 1987, the Union grieved
Mr. Boles' loss of wages and promotion. Jt.
Ex. 10.
15. The first level grievance hearing was
held on January 29, 1987. The grievance was
not resolved.
16. The second level grievance hearing was
held on March 5, 1987, but again no resolution was reached.
17. The Union filed its demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on March 9, 1987. Jt. Ex. 12.
18. There have been instances where a bargaining unit employee has been promoted within the bargaining unit or to an exempt position but later was moved to a lower-paying
position either at the discretion of the Company or at the request of the employee, and
the employee has retained the higher pay he
or she received as a result of the promotion
Since 1979, there have been at least a dozen
instances in which BGEA bargaining unit members were transferred at their request to
lower-paying jobs and their pay was reduced
accordingly.
Jt. Ex. 11.
19. The instant case is the first case in
which the Company has returned an employee
to a former position after an arbitrator's
decision. The only other arbitration case
contesting filling a vacancy was the case of
Doreen Dole, who grieved the selection of
Nancy Curley over her to the position of
Secretary/Sports in the Editorial Department.
Arbitrator Robert L. Stutz ruled on December
30, 1981 that the Company had violated the

-4contract by failing to assign the grievant and
ordered the Company to place her in the position. Jt. Ex. 13. In that case, the Company
and Ms. Dole agreed to her occupying another
position and Ms. Curley was not displaced from
her position. Ms. Curley, a clerk in the
Accounting Department and Ms. Dole, a secretary in the Advertising Department, applied for
the secretary position in the sports Department.
After the Award of Arbitrator Stutz, the Company
asked Ms. Dole if she would accept a secretarial
position in the Marketing Department. That
secretarial position in Marketing previously had
not been posted as a vacancy of job opening.
Upon Ms. Dole's agreement to occupy the secretarial position in Marketing, the Company posted
her former secretarial position in advertising.
As the foregoing stipulation indicates, the grievant was
promoted from Library Associate to Assistant Librarian on Septembe
30, 1985.

His selection by the Company for the latter position

resulted in an increase in his weekly salary from $613.25 to
$717.25. The Union's subsequent grievance on behalf of employee
Wanda M. Joseph-Rollins, which claimed that Ms. Joseph-Rollins was
entitled to the promotion instead of the grievant, was sustained
by Arbitrator Arthur Stark.

Stark found that the Company violated

the contract by awarding the Assistant Librarian position to the
grievant and ordered that Joseph-Rollins be given the job, with
back pay after successful completion of the trial period. Stark
held however that he was "without authority to grant the Union's
request that the grievant not suffer a reduction in salary."
It is that consequence - the grievant's return to or "demotion" to Library Associate with an attendant reduction in pay,
that the Union protests in the instant case, and with which Stark
did not deal because he lacked authority.
been joined in the case before me.

However the issue has

The Union's principal positions are summarized as follows:
1. The grievant worked in the Assistant Librarian's position for a year and three
months, from October 1985 until January 1987.
He was originally selected by the Company as
the bidder thought to be most qualified. He
successfully completed the 60 day trial period, and his work, overall, was evaluated as

-5"superior" and "good."
As a consequence he acquired permanent status
as an Assistant Librarian; and is entitled to
job or pay protection in that permanent status.
2. His subsequent removal from Assistant Librarian and his reassignment to Library Associate
violated Article II, Section 2, a, b, and c which
reads:
Article II: General Provisions
~T. No Reduction in Wages or Loss of Merit
There shall be no reduction in the pay of any
employee covered by the terms of this agreement during the life hereof.
The provisions of this paragraph are subject
to the following exceptions:
a. The military leave provisions as set
forth in Article V, paragraph 9.
b. Employees who voluntarily apply and are
accepted for a position which has a lower base pay, may have their pay reduced
to the appropriate scale in the new classification .
c. Employees who become incapacitated may
continue in employment at a rate of pay
mutually agreeable to the Employer and
the employee.
because it resulted in a "reduction in wages"
for a reason not specified above.
It also violated Article II, Section 8G and H,
which read:
8. Filling Vacancies
G. Change of Classification Pay
An employee moved or promoted to a higher wage
classification shall be paid in his/her new
classification at the experience level next
higher than his/her current rate of pay and
shall advance from there in the time provided
by the Wage Provision (Article VI). No employee shall incur any economic loss as a result of accepting a higher paying position as

-6herein provided.
H. Trial Period
Employees advanced to a higher paying classification shall have a trial period not to exceed sixty (60) calendar days. Two evaluations
shall be held between the department head and
the employee during this trial period. A written report of each evaluation shall be provided
to employee and union.
because it resulted in an "economic loss" to the
grievant after he had accepted a "higher Paying
position," and that he was immune from removal
from the higher classification after successful
completion of the trial period. Also, that his
increased pay when promoted from Library Associate to Assistant Librarian should be construed
as a "merit increase" and the contract bars its
revocation.
3. Following the Stark decision, the Company
told him that though he might lost the Assistant Librarian job, he "would not suffer a reduction in pay."
4. Arbitrator's have barred recoupment of money
or a reduction in pay, when it has been discovered
or held, as here, that the employer made the mistake, and where the misjudgment was not the employee's fault. But that in any even a mere correction of a clerical error in pay is in no way
similar to reducing the pay of the grievant who
had acquired permanent status as an Assistant
Librarian.
5. As the original reorganization of the library
contemplated and proposed four Assistant Librarians (i.e. an increase by three) but that only
two additional positions were created and filled,
there is or should be a de facto vacancy into
which the Company could and should have placed
the grievant.
6. What happened to the grievant is analogous to
a "layoff" (i.e. a "layoff" from the job of Assistant Librarian) which is violative of the intent of
Article VIII, Section 4 of the contract, which reads
"The employer agrees that during the term of
this agreement there will be no layoffs of
regular full-time employees except for dismissal as enumerated below in Article IIA,

-7paragraph 3 (Discharge and Probationary
Period)."
7.Similarly, what happened to the grievant
is analagous to "a pay reduction as a result
of the installation of a new process," in
violation of Article VIII, 4, which reads in
pertinent part:
"No member of this Union will be dismissed or
suffer a pay reduction as a result of installation of a new process.
If a job position or job classification is to
be eliminated or altered as a result of a new
process, the parties shall facilitate the appropriate redeployment of employees involved
11
(The clause goes on to provide retraining where
necessary, not at issue here.).
8. The Company should have handled the grievant as it did with employees Dole and Curley
following the Award of Arbitrator Stutz. There,
Stutz found that the Company erred in granting
a secretarial job to Curley that should have
gone to Dole. The Company retained Curley in
the secretarial job, and found and placed Dole
in a comparable job with comparable pay. As a
result neither lost pay and Curley was not reduced in classification. The grievant was entitled to the same accommodation, particularly
since he was in the Assistant Librarian's job
for a year and three months and Curley in the
secretarial job for only four weeks.
9. Though demoted to Library Associate, the
grievant continues to perform duties "virtually
identical for 70% of the time" to duties he performed as an Assistant Librarian, and that therefore, he was and is a de facto fourth Assistant
Librarian.
Let me first deal with Arbitrator Stark's ruling that he
lacked authority to grant the Union's request that the grievant
not suffer a pay reduction. It seems to me that for the Union to
make that specific request meant it recognized that without such
an order from the Arbitrator the normal and traditional consequent
of the Award the Union sought in that case (namely affirmation of

Joseph-Rollins grievance) would be the demotion or re-assignment
of the grievant to his earlier job as Library Associate with an
attendant reduction in pay to the level of that latter classification.

And I believe that by denying his authority or jurisdiction

with the statement "unless specifically authorized by the parties,
Stark also saw that as the normal and traditional (albeit implied)
consequence of his Award. Or in other words, he was saying that
unless the parties jointly authorized him to consider a different
effect on the grievant (e.g. barring a reduction in his pay), his
Award would result in the usual consequences, the employee wrongly
promoted would be removed and returned to the job from which he
bid, and at a lesser pay if it was a lesser classification. In
short, I think the Union and Stark recognized that the retention
of the grievant's pay at the Assistant librarian level, was an
extraordinary remedy requiring specific and joint submission to
Stark for consideration, and did not automatically follow from the
contract or customarily.
That conclusion is supported by the record before me in this
proceeding. There is inadequate probative evidence to conclude
either that the grievant was promised that he would not suffer a
pay cut or that the Company promised or

is obligated to create or

implement a fourth Assistant Librarian position for him.
He may have been told by Librarian Jobe that he "wouldn't
lose any money," but that is not all he was told. A few days
later she equivocated and said that "things were up in the air."
The grievant knew or should have known that Joseph-Rollins was
grieving.

Indeed the Joseph-Rollins grievance was filed by the

Union shortly after the grievant's selection, and he was told by
the Company's Assistant Managing Editor that if he Union prevailed
in that grievance, his tenure as an Assistant Librarian could end.
These latter statements vitiated or placed in serious doubt any
assurances that he would not be cut in pay if he lost the Assistant Librarian post.

Again, a promise to insulate him from a pay

reduction would be so unusual under the circumstances, the DoleCurley case not withstanding, as to require more certainty and

-9unambiguousness to be enforceable.
That Jobe originally proposed, and may even still wish to
have four Assistant Librarians, does not now mean that management'
decision to have three (i.e. two new ones rather than three new
ones) leaves one (the fourth) inchoate or otherwise established,
but vacant, as a spot for the grievant instead of his reduction to
Library Associate. I am not persuaded that the Company did not
make a legitimate managerial decision to trim Jobe's request from
three to two new Assistant Librarians.

And I am not persuaded

that a de facto third still exists or is needed, merely because it
was originally requested. Additionally, for reasons set forth in
this Opinion, I find no contractual basis that requires the Company to create a third new Assistant Librarianship just because
Arbitrator Stark found that Joseph-Rollins instead of the grievant
should have been selected.

This is not to say that the Company

could not have done so as an accommodation to the grievant, particularly since it was pleased with his work, and had originally
selected him. Indeed it may have been the gracious and equitable
thing for the Company to do. Rather it is to say that the Company
was not obligated to do so, and it is to obligations that the
Arbitrator is bound.
In this regard the Stutz decision and the accommodation
reached by the Company and the Union over Curley and Dole are not
precedentially binding on the instant set of facts. First, a
single such incident is not enough to constitute a "past practice.
Second, there was an open and available job into which Dole, with
his express agreement, could be placed, in satisfaction to him and
to the Union of the Stutz Award. That was a mutually agreed to
and commendable arrangement, but I cannot find that it was contractually mandated. I am not persauded that in the instant case
there was an open or available job into which the grievant (or
Joseph-Rollins) could be put by mutual agreement without the grievf
ant suffering a reduction in classification and a reduction in pay
I do not find Article II Section 2 applicable.

In my view,

the pay that is not to be reduced attaches to the particular job
the employee occupies so long as he is in that job. His pay for
that job shall not be reduced or lost.

But that does not apply if

-10his job changes.

Here, the grievant's job was changed, by opera-

tion of an Arbitrator's decision.
Librarian.

He was no longer an Assistant

So, the guarantee of the salary of that classification

no longer obtained.

What does obtain is the contract obligation

to pay a wage or salary commensurate with the job classification
occupied.

The grievant was so paid as a Library Associate.

Also,

I am not persuaded that his increase in salary when he went from
Library Associate to Assistant Librarian, was a "merit increase."
Rather it was the normal contractual differential in pay between
the two classifications. So, when the grievant returned to the
Library Associate job the reduction in pay was not a loss of a

II merit increase."
Article II Section 8 is not applicable.

The grievant did

not incur an "economic loss as a result of accepting a higher paying position." While an Assistant Librarian he received, as he
should have, the higher pay of that classification.

His "economic

loss" was not because he accepted the higher paying job, but because Arbitrator Stark held that Joseph-Rollins had a contractual
preference to that job. His "loss," if it can be so characterized,
resulted from his loss of the higher rated job, and not because he
accepted that job. As previously stated, he accepted the higher
job and received the higher pay with constructive if not actual
knowledge that there was a risk that he would lose it because of
the Joseph-Rollins grievance. That is not an "economic loss as a
result of accepting a higher paying position" within the meaning
of Section 8.
As the acquisition of "permanent" status following the successful completion of the trial period did not immunize him from
the Stark finding that another employee was entitled to the job
from the outset, it follows that permanent status did not immunize
him or any "permanent" employee, from being replaced or removed
from a "permanent job" by operation of the legal process of arbitration.

A "permanent employee" status does not, of course, mean

permanence in all circumstances.

If the appointment was wrong ab

initio, and is annulled by an Arbitrator's decision (as Stark did),
the permanent status is also annulled or rolled back to the

-11original status quo, and removal or replacement to correct the
original error follows. Indeed if the Union is correct in its
interpretation, that interpretation would have been a bar to its
earlier action on behalf of Joseph-Rollins.
I do not view the grievant's removal from the Assistant
Librarian position and his re-assignment as a Library Associate,
to be a "layoff" within the meaning of Article IIA, Section 1 of
the contract. Layoffs are reductions in the workforce because of
reductions in or loss of available work. That was not what happened here. Stark held that the grievant's appointment was an
error, and that the job should have gone to Joseph-Rollins. The
latter replaced the former as a consequence. That was not due to
a loss of or a reduction in the available work. The same quantity
of work for an Assistant Librarian continued to obtain, and there
was not a reduction in the work force, only a replacement and a
demotion. Similarly, what happened was not "a result of a new
process," which in my view means and applies to new equipment,
methods and physical arrangements. The grievant was not "displaced" for that or those reasons, but again, because his appointment was a mistake in the first place.
More serious is the Union's claim that since and despite his
return to Library Associate, the grievant continues to perform
duties that substantially fall within the Assistant Librarian
classification, specifically that his present duties "are virtually
identical for fully 70% of his time."
-,:'-'• •>'"- •
There is no doubt that the grievant is a talented and valuable employee. There is no dispute over the fact that he has the
skill and ability to do all the tasks and duties of an Assistant
Librarian, as he did for a year and three months. He was not removed from the Assistant Librarian job because of poor or even
marginal work. He was evaluated as "good" and "superior," and
initially was the Company's first choice for the promotion. If
he still handles the duties of an Assistant Librarian he should
be entitled to the pay of that classification and to an official

-12upgrading to that classification.

This would be consistent with

the general arbitral rule and the contract that employees shall
be paid the salary or wages of the job they perform, and that includes classification and pay corrections if and where an employee
is "working out of classification" by performing the duties of a
! higher rated job.
But I find that that question is not before me and I make no
determination on it, including assessing the substantive nature
of the 70% that the Union says is virtually identical and the 30%
that is not. The instant grievance is limited to the grievant's
removal from the Assistant Librarian classification, his reassignment to the job of Library Associate and his resultant reduction
in pay and was filed when that event took place. It does not encompass a claim that now, as a Library Associate, he still performs all or enough of the duties of an Assistant Librarian to be
entitled to the pay for that classification and/or for an official
upgrading to it.

That may be another grievance involving

subse-

quent facts, and the rights of the parties in that connection and
in that event, are expressly reserved.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Grievance No. 87-01
Boles, is denied.

involving William

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 3, 1990
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Brookhaven Beach HRF
FINAL

AWARD

and
Local 144 S.E.I.U.

This is the third and Final Award with reference to all
issues submitted to me for arbitration in accordance with a
jointly signed letter dated November 30, 1984, and in accordance
with the collective bargaining agreement entered into between
Brookhaven Beach HRF and Local 144 dated November 30, 1984.
As previously indicated in my prior Interim Award, the
arbitral issues are as follows:
All issues relating to the liability of
Brookhaven Beach HRF for contributions
to the Local 144 funds; and all issues
relating to wages for the period April
1, 1984, through March 31, 1987.
The proceedings before me have been extensive and protracted and have involved the submission of extensive testimony
and documentary evidence involving a multiplicity of issues, including but not limited to the financial condition of Brookhaven
Beach HRF; the applicable Medicaid Regulations that are concerned
with all the issues raised; the appropriate accounting procedures
to be applied thereto; and contract interpretation. Both sides
have been accorded full opportunity to present full cases on the
issues.
A W A R D
A. Brookhaven Beach HRF shall make the following payments to all collective bargaining
employees as follows:

1. I do hereby confirm and ratify my prior
Interim Awards with respect to wages to be
paid to all Bargaining Unit employees for
the 1984 and 1985 contract years.

-22. With respect to the 1986 contract year,
I do hereby direct that Brookhaven Beach
HRF shall pay a lump sum payment to all
Bargaining Unit employees equivalent to a
5% wage increase for the period July 1, 1986,
until March 31, 1987.
Fund Contributions
I do hereby confirm and ratify my prior
Interim Awards with respect to the fund
contributions that shall be paid by
Brookhaven Beach HRF for the 1984 and
1985 contract years. In addition to the
foregoing, I do hereby determine that the
same terms and conditions of said Award
shall apply to the 1986 contract year.
The above Award with respect to fund contributions, shall be limited by my jurisdiction in this matter in accordance with
the November 30, 1984, agreement, to wit
that my Award herein "shall not result in
any adjustment to fund contributions less
favorable on a pro-rata basis to Brookhaven
Beach HRF than those agreed to between Local
144 and any other Southern New York facility
for the contract period April 1, 1984, to
March 31, 1987."
Payment of all monies due to be paid in accordance with this Final Award shall be paid within 30 days from the date hereof.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 12, 1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 144, S.E.I.U.

and
Clearview Nursing Home

This Award represents a final determination with regard
to all issues that have been submitted to me concerning "Reimbursement" and/or "Affordability" with regard to the contract
years 1984, 1985 and 1986 commencing April 1, 1984, through March
31, 1987. As such, this Award supersedes any and all prior
Interim Awards heretofore determined herein.
Both of the parties have submitted extensive evidence to
me including documents, records, testimony and financial analyses
' concerning the many issues that are involved in making arbitral
determinations of "Reimbursement" and "Affordability" for the
periods heretofore described.
I have reviewed in detail, the terms and conditions of
the contracts entered into between the parties, and more particularly the "Reimbursement clause" and other provisions of the contracts, as amended by the parties, that relate to all of the forej! going.
I have also examined the positions advanced by both partie
! as to the methodology or methodologies that are relevant and many
sophisticated legal and accounting theories proposed by each of
the parties with respect to the facts.
After review of all of the above, I do Award as follows:
A. Fund Contributions
I decline to grant any relief to Clearview
Nursing Home for each and all of the years
of the contract including April 1, 1984, through
March 31, 1987. As such, Clearview shall be
required to make all contributions required
to be made under the contract executed between
the parties in November, 1984, as amended in
April 1989, for the period April 1, 1984,
through March 31, 1987.

-2-

B. Wages
With respect to all wages and lump sums
due under the November 1984 contract as
amended in the April 1989 contract, for
the period April 1, 1984 through March 31,
1987, I do hereby determine as follows:
1. Clearview shall pay a lump sum of 6%%
to all covered employees for periods actually .
worked by such covered employees for the period July 15, 1984, through December 31, 1984.
2. Clearview shall pay a lump sum of 5% to
all covered employees for all periods actually
worked by all covered employees for the period of January 1, 1985, through December 31,
1985.
3. Clearview shall pay a lump sum of 4% to
all covered employees for all periods actually
worked by all covered employees for the period April 15, 1986, until the expiration of
the contract.
4. Payment of the above sums shall be made to
all covered employees within 60 days of the
date hereof.
5. Any and all monies paid to any employee
or employees during the pendency of this proceeding, either pursuant to any prior Interim
Award or otherwise, shall be credited against
the amounts due under this Award.

Eric J? Schmertz
Chaj/fman
DATED: March 12, 1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

y
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Frank McKinney
Concurring
Dissenting
DATED: March Jl1
1990
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Frank McKinney do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: March ^&>~-l 990
i i STATE OF New York ) .
! l COUNTY OF New York)
' '
I, Herbert Rothman do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers of America,
AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case #1330 1243

88

and
Consolidated Edison Company
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration
in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
Under the job protection conditions expressed in the Chairman's Opinion, the
Company does not violate the Collective
Bargaining Agreement when it unilaterally assigns Senior Nuclear Production
Technicians to the Fire Brigade.

DATED: August
1990
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: August
1990
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )

Ross A. Rimicci
Concurring
Dissenting

I, Ross A. Rimicci do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: August
1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Jack Murphy
Concurring
Dissenting

I, Jack Murphy do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers of America,
AFL CI°

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #1330 1243

and
Consolidated Edison Company

On June 27, 1989 I rendered a Ruling on the Scope of the
Issue and Arbitrability in which I held inter alia that the
Company could require the members of the fire brigade to take a
stress test. I also found arbitrable the grievance of Senior
Nuclear Production Technicians, challenging their involuntary
assignment to the fire brigade. The instant phase of this arbitration now concerns the latter question.
The stipulated issue is:
Does the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement when it unilaterally assigns Senior Nuclear Production Technicians
to the Fire Brigade, and if so, what shall
be the remedy?
Hearings were held on September 16 and November 27, 1989 at
which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Tripar-

tite Board of Arbitration consisted of Mr. Jack Murphy, Union
designee, Mr. Ross A. Rimicci, Company designee, and the Undersigned as Chairman. The Oath of the Board was waived. A stenographic record was taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs
Thereafter the Board met in executive session.
I understand and appreciate the reasons for the grievance.
Before the grievance, Senior Nuclear Production Technicians (SNPT)
when assigned to the fire brigade, were required to take and pass
a Radiation Health Physical examination every two years,

as re-

-2quired by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but not a traditional
"stress test. "
Under that circumstance no real issue arose over whether
membership in the fire brigade was a required part of their job.
But with the introduction of a stress test and my Ruling upholding
the right of the Company to administer it, the grievants became
understandably worried that this new requirement could jeopardize
their jobs if membership in the fire brigade was a required duty.
Specifically, if passing a stress test was required, and if they
declined to take it or could not pass it, they believed they would
be found unqualified for their job classification and would or
could be terminated.

To the grievants, most of whom are in their

forties and who were not previously required to take and pass a
stress test, it represented a physical hazard and a new condition
of employment not previously required, and for which, after many
years of employment and considering their age, they might not be
capable of passing. Additionally, it is understandable and logical for them to believe that fire fighting was not related to the
duties, skills and responsibilities of a Senior Nuclear Production
Technician, and hence, though many had served on the fire brigade
over the years, they did so volunatrily and/or as a normal cooperative response to the emergency of a fire.
However, by contract, by express assignment and by practice,
T must find that assignment to the fire brigade of SNPT is generally a mandatory duty and hence part of their job functions.
First, the Managerial Rights clause of the contract gives
the Company the right to make such assignments and not rely upon
the voluntary or cooperative participation of the SNPT's.
XI Section 43 of the contract reads:
43. Management and Operation of the Business;
Rights of Employees and the Union: (1) The
right and power to select and hire all employees, to suspend, discipline, demote or discharge them for reasonable cause, to promote
them to supervisory positions, to assign,
supervise and direct all working forces, to
maintain discipline and efficiency among them
and to exercise the other customary functions
of the Management for the carrying on of the

Article

-3business and operation, are recognised as
vested exclusively in the Company,
Such
right and power shall not be exercised arbitrarily or unfairly as to any employee
and shall not be exercised so as to violate
any provision of this Contract. No rule,
procedure or practice of the Management shall
be contrary to any provision of this Contract.
(emphasis added)
In implementation of the management right to "assign the
working force," the Company, as early as June 7, 1975 issued a
Fire Emergency Plan in which General Watch Foreman, Watch Foreman
and Chemical Technicians

(then the titles for the grievants) were

"assigned to a permanent Fire Fighting Brigade to form a nucleus
around which an efficient firefighting force can be organized for
a fire contingency."

With that right to make job assignments,

the fact that there may be no substantive relationship between the
occupational work of the SNPT and emergency firefighting, is
immaterial .
As the facts relate to the particular grievants in this case,
it is also evident that the Company, by allowing SNPT ' s who were
not fire brigade qualified work the watch, by not specifically

r

listing b/r^Ag fire brigade qualified as part of the job requirements
or specifically listing the fire brigade training

in the training

curriculum, is somewhat responsible for the SNPT ' s believing that
-

being fire brigade qualified was part of their job requirements.
However, for the reasons previously stated, such acts on the part
of the Company do not cause the Company to waive its right to
assign, supervise, and direct all working forces.

There was and

has been a sufficiently consistent practice of SNPT participating
in the fire brigade and taking updated firefighting training, to
constitute a binding implementation of the 1975 Plan.

And that

practice is persuasive evidence that the Company intended that one
duty of the SNPT was to be part of the fire brigade and the Company
carried out that intention with regular assignments to the Brigade
over the years.

Consequently, based on the Company's right to

"assign," the exercise of that right in the Fire Emergency Plan
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of 1975 and the continued practice thereafter, I find that membership in the Fire Brigade is part of the job and duties of the SNPT
The consequences of not taking or not passing the stress test
are not as grave as the grievants perceive.

I do not see that it

will result in job loss. First, any if not all of the SNPT will
probably pass the stress test (which I understand is legally adequate, but less strenuous than traditionally perceived). If so,
there is no problem.
The few, if any, who do not pass it, can and should be
handled under the jointly negotiated Permanent Limited Duty Policy
agreed to on August 3, 1989.
Though the parties are familiar, of
course with that Agreement its Purpose and Policy bear repeating
here, to wit:
A.

The Company will assign employees who
cannot perform their regular duties
due to the imposition of Permanent
Medical Restrictions to some work function which the employee is capable of
performing provided that such work is
available, the employee is qualified
and his/her record has in all respects
been satisfactory.

B.

All actions under this procedure will be
in accordance with the Company's Affirmative action Program - Employment of the
Handicapped and Disabled Veterans - Corporate Policy Statement (CPS) 500-12.

Clearly, utilization of this Policy is appropriate and equitable.

After all, if SNPT in or approaching middle age, are for

the first time required to pass a stress test to qualify for one
of their job duties, it would be grossly unfair and harsh, if
after years of good and dedicated service, a medical limitation of
this type, under these circumstances, caused them to be terminated
The few, if any, SNPT's who would fall into the Limited Duty group
will be accommodated by assignment to other functions they are
capable of performing in accordance with and under the provisions
of the aforesaid Policy.

-5So, within the frame and conditions as set forth aforementioned, and specifically with the job security protections
and probabilities expressed and incorporated into this Opinion,
I find no contract violation by the Company's assignment of SNPT
to the Fire Brigade.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
August 6, 1990

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers of America,
AFL-CIO

AWARD
Case #1330 1243

and
Consolidated Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration
in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
Under the job protection conditions expressed in the Chairman's Opinion, the
Company does not violate the Collective
Bargaining Agreement when it unilaterally assigns Senior Nuclear Production
Technicians to the Fire Brigade.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: July 22, 1990
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: July
1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Ross A. Rimicci
Concurring
Dissenting

I, Ross A. Rimicci do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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DATED: July
1990
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )s"'''

Jack Murphy
Concurring
Dissenting

I, Jack Murphy do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Utility Workers of America,
AFL-CIO

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #1330 1243 88

and
Consolidated Edison Company
On June 27, 1989 I rendered a Ruling on the Scope of the
Issue and Arbitrability in which I held inter alia that the
Company could require the members of the fire brigade to take a
stress test. I also found arbitrable the grievance of Senior
Nuclear Production Technicians, challenging their involuntary
assignment to the fire brigade. The instant phas of this arbitration now concerns the latter question.
The stipulated issue is:
Does the Company violate the collective bargaining agreement when it unilaterally assigns Senior Nuclear Proction Technicians
to the Fire Brigade, and if so, what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on September 16 and November 27, 1989
at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Tripartite Board of Arbitration consisted of Mr. Jack Murphy, Union
designee, Mr. Ross A. Rimicci, Company designee, and the Undersigned as Chairman. The Oath of the Board was waived. A stenographic record was taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs
Thereafter the Board met in executive session.
I understand and appreciate the reasons for the grievance.
Before the grievance, Senior Nuclear Production Technicians (SNPT)
when assigned to the fire brigade, were required to take and pass
a Radiation Health Physical examination every two years, (as required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but not a traditional
"stress test."

-2Under that circumstance no real issue arose over whether
membership in the fire brigade was a required part of their job.
But with the introduction of a stress test and my Ruling upholding the right of the Company to administer it, the grievants became understandably worried that this new requirement could
jeopardize their jobs if membership in the fire brigade was a
required duty.

Specifically, if passing a stress test was re-

quired, and if they declined to take it or could not pass it,
they believed they would be found unqualified for their job class
ification and would or could be terminated. To the grievants,
most of whom are in their fortys and who were not previously required to take and pass a stress test, it represented a physical
hazard and a new condition of employment not previously required,
and for which, after many years of employment and considering
their age, they might not be capable of passing. Additionally,
it is understandable and logical for them to believe that fire
fighting was not related to the duties, skills and responsibilities
of a nuclear operator, and hence, though many had served on the
fire brigade over the years, they did so voluntarily and/or as
a normal cooperative response to the emergency of a fire.
However, by contract, by express assignment and by practice,
I must find that assignment to the fire brigade of SNPT was and
is a mandatory duty and hence part of their job functions.
First, the Managerial Rights clause of the contract gives
the Company the right to make such assignments and not rely upon
the voluntary or cooperative participation of the SNPT's.
XI Section 43 of the contract reads:
43. Management and Operation of the Business;
Rights of Employees and the Union: (1) The
right and power to select and hire all employees, to suspend, discipline, demote or discharge them for reasonable cause, to promote
them to supervisory positions, to assign,
supervise, and direct all working forces, to
maintain discipline and efficiency among them
and to exercise the other customary functions
of the Management for the carrying on of the

Article

-3business and operations, are recognized as
vested exclusively in the Company. Such
right and power shall not be exercised arbitrarily or unfairly as to any employee and
shall not be exercised so as to violate any
provision of this Contract. No rule, procedure or practice of the Management shall
be contrary to any provision of this Contract,
(emphasis added).
In implementation of the management right to "assign the
working force," the Company, as early as June 7, 1975 issued a
Fire Emergency Plan in which General Watch Foreman, Watch Foreman
and Chemical Technicians (then the titles for the grievants) were
"assigned to a permanent Fire fighting Brigade to form a nucleus
around which an efficient firefighting force can be organized for
a fire contingency." With that right to make job assignments,
the fact that there may be no substantive relationship between the
occupational work of the SNPT and emergency
material .

firefighting, is im-

Thereafter, though I have no doubt that the grievants though
their firefighting training and participation in the Brigade was
at best a collateral function and voluntary, there was and has
been a sufficiently consistent practice of SNPT participating in
the fire brigade and taking updated firefighting training, to
constitute a binding implementation of the 1975 Plan. And that
practice is persuasive evidence that the Company intended that one
duty of the SNPT was to be part of the fire brigade and the Compan
carried out that intention with regular assignments to the Brigade
over the years.

Consequently, based on the Company's right to

"assign," the exercise of that right in the Fire emergency Plan
of 1975 and the continued practice thereafter, I find that membership in the Fire Brigade is part of the job and duties of the SNPT
However, I conclude that the grievants have overeacted to
the consequences of not taking or not passing the stress test. I
do not see that it will result in job loss. First, many if not
all of the SNPT will probably pass the stress test (which I understand is legally adequate, but less strenuous than traditionally
perceived).

If so, there is no problem.

-4The few, if any, who do not pass it, can and should be
handled under the jointly negotiated Permanent Limited Duty
Policy, agreed to on August 3, 1989.

Though the parties are

familiar, of course, with that Agreement its Purpose and Policy
bear repeating here, to wit:
A. The Company will assign employees who
cannot perform their regular duties
due to the imposition of Permanent
Medical Restrictions to some work function which the employee is capable of
performing provided that such work is
available, the employee is qualified and
his/her record has in all respects been
satisfactory.
B.

All actions under this procedure will be
in accordance with the Company's Affirmative Action Program - Employment of the
Handicapped and Disabled Veterans - Corporate Policy Statement (CPS) 500-12.

Clearly, utilization of this Policy is appropriate and
equitable. After all, if SNPT in or approaching middle age, are
for the first time required to pass a stress test to qualify for
one of their job duties, it would be grossly unfair and harsh, if
after years of good and dedicated service, a medical limitation of
this type, under these circumstances, caused them to be terminated.
I am sure that the few, if any, SNPT who would fall into the Limited
Duty group could and will be accommodated by assignment to other
functions they are capable of performing. And, to ease one additional fear of the grievants, I conclude that under the foregoing
Policy, priority for such placement would be by and at Indian
Point, with placement elsewhere if eligible positions are not
available at Indian Point.
So, within the frame and conditions as set forth aforementioned, and specifically with the job security, protections
and probabilities expressed and incorporated into this Opinion,
I find no contract violation by the Company's assignment of SNPT
to the Fire Brigade.

July 22, 1990

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Eastchester Teachers

Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1939 0190 89

and
Eastchester U.F.S.D.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the grievance was timely at Step I.
If timely, did the District violate the
Agreement by:
1. Failing to provide details
of parental complaints.
2. Failing to timely notify
the grievant of such parental complaints.
3.

Failing to make every effort
to resolve the parental complaints before administrative
action was taken.

If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 5, 1990 at which time the
teacher involved, Alice M. Thompson, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Association
and District appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath was waived. The parties
filed post-hearing briefs.
Step I (i.e. Level One) of the grievance procedure reads in
pertinent part:
a. The aggrieved will first present the
grievance in writing no later than ten
school days after the grievance occurs,
or knoweldge should reasonably be had
thereof, to the principal or immediate
superior with whom it will be discussed

-2directly or, at the aggrieved person's request, in conjunction with the Association's
representative, with the objective of resolving the matter. The principal or immediate superior shall render his decision within five school days after the grievance was
discussed.
It is immaterial whether the grievant presented her grievance within the ten school days prescribed, because the Association met that time limit.

Under Article VI A Definitions, para-

graph 2, the "aggrieved" is expressly defined as "the teacher,
teachers, or Association making the claim (emphasis added). Basec
on the record, I am satisfied that the Association did not know of
the parental complaints about the grievant or the district's evaluation of her that followed, until July 12, 1989 when the grievant
informed the Association.

At that point, school was in summer re-

cess, and "school days" within the meaning of Level One, were not
running. They began to again run when the school year began in
September, 1989.
The Association filed a formal written grievance
on August 2, which was received by the District on August 7.
(Earlier, on July 18, 1989 the Association verbally discussed the
grievance with the District). So, constructively by July 18, and
in compliance with the requirement for a written grievance on
August 2, the Association grieved before the expiration of ten
school days after it learned of the grievance.
Thus the grievance as pursued by the Association on behalf of the grievant is
arbitrable, even if the grievant herself did not formally file a
written grievance within the time limit after she knew of the complants and the District's evaluation.
I need not decide each of the Association's allegations of
procedural "failures" of the District as referred to in the stipulated issue.

That is because the Superintendent, Dr. Charles

Murphy, asserted that the parental complaints about the grievant
were not the basis for his evaluation of her, but only "jogged"
his memory that she was due for and he had promised her an evaluation. The complaining parents did not follow his instructed and

-3prescribed procedure to discuss their complaints directly with
the grievant, and he did not disclose the names of the complainants to the grievant. In the course of the hearing, Dr. Murphy
and the District agreed that under those circumstances, there
should be nothing in the grievant's file relating to the complaint
With that concession, I shall order that all references to the
parental complaints should and shall be removed from any and all
files on the grievant, and no reliance on or reference to those
complaints in any way may be used or revealed in the future.
That expungement order, makes moot any findings of "failure"
by the district to notify, provide details on, and to make efforts
to resolve said complaints.
It is not illogical or unreasonable for the Association to
argue, as it does, that the subsequent evaluation of the grievant,
and her changes in teaching assignments resulting therefrom were
based on the parental complaints, and should, like those complaint^
also be nullified and expunged from the grievant's record. However, I do not reach that conclusion. I accept the District's
explanation that the grievant was due for an evaluation, and I am
persuaded that an evaluation would have been made at about the
time it was made or soon thereafter, whether or not there were
parental complaints. And though I am sure the parental complaints
were in Dr. Murphy's mind when he made the evaluation I am not
prepared to conclude that the substantive findings of the evalu-

I
ation were cast by or critically (and therefore fatally) influence)!
by the invalidated parental complaints. Frankly, that is too
cynical and malevolent a view in the absence of more evidence
connecting the parental complaints with the Superintendent's findings in the evaluation

that followed.

Accordingly, I am not pre-

pared to nullify the evaluation or the grievant's reassignment
that followed. What I do not conclude, however, is that the evaluation was
substantively accurate. The issues of the accuracy
and correctness of the evaluation were not litigated in this proceeding.

All that I have done is to rule that the evaluation

-4was not procedurally defective merely because it followed the now
nullified parental complaints.
Therefore, if the Association has contractual rights or
rights in any other forum to challenge the substantive findings
of the evaluation of the grievant on the merits, those rights are
not prejudiced by this proceeding and hence are expressly reserved
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties makes the following AWARD:
1.

The grievance of Alice M. Thompson, as
pursued on her behalf by the Association,
is arbitrable.

2.

All references to the instant parental
complaints about Ms. Thompson should have
been and shall be removed from all her
files and records, and may not be referred
to or used in the future.

3.

Dr. Murphy's evaluation of Ms. Thompson
was not procedurally improper and the
Association's request that it be redacted
from the records, is denied.

4.

Whatever rights the Association may have
to challenge the substantive findings of
that evaluation on the merits, are expressly reserved.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 17, 1990
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Elmont Elementary Teachers
Association

OPINION and AWARD
Case No. 17-390-0061-89

and
Elmont Board of Education,
Union Free School District

The stipulated issue is:
Did the District violate Article IVA and
Schedule B If C of the 1988-1991 Agreement
when it assigned certain teachers to a
school day that was outside the normal
starting and ending times for teachers?
If so what shall be the remedy?
It is stipulated that the "normal starting and ending
times" are as set forth below at the schools listed:
Alden Terrace
8:10 - 2:55
Gotham Avenue
8:10 - 2:55
Dutch Broadway
8:30 - 3:15
Clara Carlson
8:45 - 3:30
Covert Avenue
8:55 - 3:40
Stewart Manor
8:55 - 3:40
Hearings were held on December 4, 1989 and January 3,' 1990
at the District's offices in Elmont, New York, at which time representatives of the above-named Association and District appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer argument and evidence
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's Oath
was waived, and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
It is undisputed that the District scheduled some teachers
to come to work earlier than or later than the above listed normal
starting times and to end their respective work days earlier or
later than the above listed ending times. The District did so to
"better service" the educational needs of small groups of students

-2These "flexible hours" were designed for example, to give students
music or vocal instruction, remedial reading instruction, band and
orchestra activities, art instruction, and to allow for those activities before or after the normal work day so that they would
not interfere with or take those students away from regular classes
and the regular pedogogical program.
In each instance of a "flexible" work day, the affected
teacher did not work more than the contractual 6 hours and 45
minutes.

They were paid straight time wages, and for those in-

volved in this grievance, did not receive an extra stipend for
"after school activities" as referred to in Schedule B, Paragraph
C of the contract.
The District is correct in pointing out that the contract
does not specify a starting or ending time of the work day, but
only limits the work day to six hours and forty-five minutes.

If

that was the only contractual consideration, and unless I found
that the District "manipulated" the work day schedule of some
teachers to avoid paying extra for "after school activities," I
would uphold the District's action.
But the contractual considerations are not so limited.
Article IV A reads:
Hours: The teaching day shall not be in
excess of six hours forty-five minutes
inclusive of a duty-free lunch period of
not less than fifty minutes including
supervision as may be required under subparagraph "C" hereof, and five hours and
thirty minutes of pupil contact time.
Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the Administration from calling, after the teaching day, a maximum of four
staff meetings per month; it being further
understood that teachers shall remain at
their stations until children board buses
safely.
Significantly, I conclude, it includes only two activities
that require or may require a teacher to remain "after the teaching day."

And they are for "staff meetings" and "until children

-3board buses safely."

These two activities are evidentiary of a

precise or fixed hour for the end of a teaching day.

For, to

require a teacher to remain beyond the end of a teaching day, eithdr
for a staff meeting or to insure the safe loading of the buses,
must mean, obviously and logically, a period or point of time
measured from and after a precise end to the teaching day. Teachers
on flexible schedules, especially those who begin later and end
later, would still be teaching during a period in which a staff
meeting could be scheduled or when buses are loading. And they
would be engaged in an activity, (i.e. teaching) beyond the end
of the "normal" work day. That is not among the two activities
specified in Article IV A.
So, on its face, I am not certain that the six hour and
forty-five minute work day is as unrestricted in terms of starting
and ending times, as the District asserts.

Indeed, it can be

argued that if the District wanted some teachers to have working
hours different from what was "normal," it should have included
that as another circumstance which could keep teachers "at their
stations" after the normal end of the teaching day.
However, even with the foregoing interpretation, I would
construe the intent and meaning of the two exceptions, as they
would apply to or determine a precise set of starting and ending
times, as ambiguous at best, and not clear enough to confine all
teachers to a work day with starting and ending hours as stipulatec
in the issue.
But there is more, which I conclude is determinative. In
the negotiations for the current contract, the parties agreed to
an increase in the "instructional day" by twenty minutes, to five
and one-half hours, although the teacher's work day remained at
six hours and forty-five minutes.

That agreement was formally

memorialized in a memorandum dated January 6, 1986 from Dr. Caliencfo
to the teaching staff. The memorandum not only confirmed the extension of the "instructional day," but also set forth a schedule
for the teachers workday at each of the schools.

Those schedules,

-4as set forth in the memorandum read:

Alden Terrace
Gotham Avenue
Dutch Broadway
Clara Carlson
Covert Avenue
Stewart Manor

Teacher's
Day Begins
8:10
8:10
8:30
8:45
8:55
8:55

Children's
Day Begins
" 8:20
8:20
8:40
8:55
9:05
9:05

Children's
Day Ends
2:40
2:40
3:00
3:15
3:25
3:25

Teacher's
Day Ends
2:55
2:55
3:15
3:30
3:40
3:40

Though the District now argues that it was not intended
to fix starting and ending hours of the six hour and forty-five
minute work day, it certainly appears to do so, and nowhere in
that memorandum, either expressly in its body or by footnote or
by statement to the Association, did the District indicate or
reserve any right to schedule some teachers on a different or
flexible schedule.
Indeed, the memorandum also states:
A collaborative effort was followed in
developing this schedule. Full consultation with EETA took place. The single
most important factor in determining the
times for each school was the availability
of transportation. Many options were considered before a decision was made on the
schedule presented above.
In view of the "collaborative effort" and the "full consultation with EETA," I think it reasonable, indeed compelling,
that the Association interpreted the memorandum and the understandings, which included and apparently accorded the District its
desired extension of the instructional day, to fix or confirm the
starting and ending hours of the work day at each of the schools,
as expressly listed. In other words, considering the extensive
and full negotiations involved, and the explicit listing of the
beginning hours and ending hours of the Teachers Day along with
the explicit beginning and ending hours of the Children's Day, I
find that the District constructively estopped itself from reserving any right to unilaterally change those starting and ending
hours for any teachers, the pedogogical merits of any such change

-5-

notwithstanding.
Let me hasten to observe that I do not doubt the legitimate educational purposes for which flexible scheduling was done.
Based on this record which leaves unclear whether the activities
of the teachers so scheduled were activities that fell within
Schedule B, I cannot conclude that the District manipulated the
work schedules to avoid paying extra for those activities. But
my authority is limited to whether the unilateral changes are
allowed under the contract, not whether they are educationally
sound.

If barred by the contract, the educational merit is of

no arbitral consequence.
But there is more that contractually restricts the District
A policy statement by the District, adopted "prior to 9/67)" and
"amended 7/7/70 and 5/3/74" and, so far as this record is concerned, never revoked or modified, further and conclusively establishes a fixed work day with explicit starting and ending hours.
That Policy reads:
The teaching day shall not be in excess of
six hours forty-five minutes inclusive of
a duty-free lunch period of not less than
fifty minutes including supervision as may
be required under Policy #4114.2. The
teacher's day shall commence one-half hour
prior to the instructional day and shall
terminate fifteen minutes after the students'
dismissal. Nothing herein shall be construed
to prevent the Administration from calling,
after the teaching day a maximum of four staff
meetings per month; it being further understood that teachers shall remain at their
stations until children board busses safely.
Clearingly, it is both a recitation of the contract langua^
of Article IV, but also a policy clarification. It not only sets
the teaching day as six hours forty-five minutes, but goes on to
explain
"The teacher's day shall commence one-half
hour prior to the instructional day and
shall terminate fifteen minutes after the
students' dismissal." (emphasis added)

-6Read in conjunction with Dr. Caliendo's memorandum of
January 6, 1986, it means to me that a regular work day had been
promulgated by the District as early as 1967, and that that work
day was delimited by a regular starting time of one-half hour before and a regular end, fifteen minutes after the instructional
day.

And as the instructional day had fixed beginning and ending

hours, so too, per force, did the teachers' day.
Significantly and conclusively, the reiteration of the
beginning and ending hours of the teachers' day in Dr. Caliendo's
memorandum of January 6, 1986 must be viewed as confirmation,(perhaps unintentionally by Dr. Caliendo) of what was in place since
as early as 1967 and negotiated then or later as part of Article
IV A, or the way Article IV A should be applied. And what that
was and is, is a teachers regular work day not just of six hours
and forty-five minutes but with beginning and ending hours at the
schools, as listed. That there may have been a past practice of
"flexible scheduling" is immaterial where, as here, it is barred
by the contract.
Therefore, for the District to unilaterally change the beginning and ending hours of the teachers work day of any of the
teachers covered by this collective bargaining agreement, is violative of Article IV A of said collective bargaining agreement.
As the Association has not shown that the work assignments were
within those for which extra pay is accorded under Schedule B,
the request for extra pay for that work is denied, and the Award
shall be limited to a cease and desist order.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The District violated Article IV A of
the 1988-1991 Agreement when it assigned
certain teachers to a school day that
was outside the normal starting and ending time for teachers. The District is
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directed to cease and desist from
making any such assignments.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 15, 1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) l
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Grocery, Bakery, Construction
Drivers and Helpers, Local 559

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #12 300 00182 8£

and
First National Supermarkets, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance dated January 17, 1988 on behalf
of Bruce R. Foss?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitratio
Association in Hartford, Connecticut on December 15, 1989 at which
time Mr. Foss, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared. All
concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Following
the hearing, and pursuant to arrangements agreed to, a certain
employment record was submitted, and both sides were afforded an
opportunity to file a brief regarding that employment record. The
Company filed such a brief. The Union summarized its case verbally at the end of the hearing.
The Union's grievance dated January 17, 1988 reads:
On September 13, 1987 I was hired full-time
and received a wage reduction. I believe
this was wrong as I have been employed parttime since 5-9-1980.
Bruce R. Foss
The facts of the grievant's employment are not in dispute.
He became a part-time driver in 1980 and continued in that capacit;

-2until September 13, 1987 at which time he sought and accepted a
job as a full-time driver.
$12.45 an hour.

His last pay rate as a part-timer was

Upon becoming full-time he pay was fixed at $10.89

an hour.
The Company asserts that the reduction in hourly pay is consistent with and mandated by Addendum "A" Wage Section 3 of the
contract.

That Section reads in pertinent part:
3. Drivers' Hiring Scale Employees Hired after September 28,
1986.
New Hire Progressions - Drivers 1st
Year of Employment - $2.00 per hour
less than hourly scale rate.

There is no dispute that the rate of $10.89 paid the grievant was $2.00 less than the then hourly scale rate.
What is in dispute is whether the foregoing Section was
applicable to the grievant.
The Union's claim that the asterisk sentence immediately
preceeding Section three, which reads:
"No one in these categories will suffer a
reduction in wages should they become fulltime .
precludes a reduction in the grievant's pay when he became fulltime is not contractually supported.

That sentence, particularly

because the asterisk obviously refers to certain job classifications (identified by asterisk) in Section 2 of the Addendum is
applicable and limited to those classifications in the warehouse,
and, neither by its location in the Addendum (i.e. before Section
3) nor by specific asterisk can it be logically applied to drivers
The Union's contention that it was intended to be applied
to drivers as well by a mutual agreement at contract negotiations,
has not been shown by adequate probative evidence. Indeed, I am
persuaded that if there was such a mutual agreement, the foregoing
sentence would have been made part of Section 3 and the driver
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classification would have carried an asterisk as well.

The con-

tract language and structure on this point is clear and unambiguou
and a verbal agreement to the contrary has not been shown.
More in point is the Union's argument that the grievant was
not a "New Hire" when he became full-time because he had previousl
worked a number of years for the Company as a part-timer. Essentially, it is the Union's assertion that Section 3 applies to employees hired as drivers "from the street" who have had no previous employment as drivers with the Company. And that by virtue
of the grievant's prior employment as a part-timer the pay rate
of $2.00 less than scale for new hires in the first year of employment was not applicable to him and he should have been accorded
the full-time rate when he became a full-time driver.
The Company responds that the grievant was a "new hire" with
in the meaning of Section 3 because it had no contractual duty to
offer a full-time opening to a part-timer, and because the grievant voluntarily sought the full-time job and was not, in any contractual sense promoted or transferred to it. Also, the Company
points out that though his pay scale was reduced he acquired many
fringe benefits as a full-time employ that he did not enjoy and
was not entitled to as a part-timer.
On this latter point, I find the contract language ambiguous
Two logical but different interpretations are equally possible and
plausible. As the Union contends the phrases "New Hires" and "1st
Year of Employment" can refer, logically and reasonably, to employees who have not worked for the Company before in any capacity
as a driver, and upon being hired as full-time drivers are, in all
respects in their "1st Year of Employment with the Company."
Equally logical and reasonable is the Company's interpretation tha
"New Hire" and the "New Hire Progression" applies to anyone who
begins full-time employment, inasmuch as the "hourly scale rate"
and the "Progression" is applicable only to full-time status. And
as the sentence barring a reduction in wages upon becoming fulltime is controlling only as to two classifications in the warehous

-4the Section 3 language, per force, makes full-time drivers "new
hires" upon becoming full-time, regardless of any prior employment
with the Company as part-time drivers.
As the parties well know, contract ambiguities are resolved
by arbitrators by resort to practice under the disputed contract
language. Where there has been a consistent or meaningful practice, that practice then represents the way the parties intended
or understand the contract to mean. Absent a probative practice,
the issue must then be resolved on the traditional basis of "burden of proof", with the burden on the Union as the grieving party.
Here, there has been a practice that I deem probative and
controlling, and it is a practice supportive of the Company's
position in this proceeding.
The undisputed record indicates that eight part-time drivers
became full-time during the term of the 1986-88 contract.

Seven

were treated as "new hires1:* and had their hourly wage rates reduced under Section 3 of the Addendum when they became full-time.
Only one of the eight did not have a downward adjustment in his
rate of pay to the level $2.00 below scale. None of the seven who
were paid under Section 3 grieved, nor were grievances filed by
the Union in those cases alleging contract breaches. It is well
settled that a single variation from an otherwise consistent practice, does not vitiate the practice.

I am satisfied that seven

instances without protest from the employees or the Union is of
sufficient quantity to constitute a consistent practice, and the
single exception therefrom is not fatal, in interpreting the intended meaning and application of Section 3 of Addendum "A" Wages
of the contract.

Alternatively, the Union has not shown a prac-

tice supportive of its interpretation, and hence would not have
met its burden of proof if that point had been reached.
Accordingly, I find that the Company accorded the grievant
the proper wage rate when he became a full-time driver.
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The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance dated January 17,
1988 on behalf of Bruce R. Foss is denied.

DATED: January 23, 1990
STATE OF New York )ss COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Metal Trades Council

OPINION AND AWARD
MTC-234-89

and
General Dynamics, Electric Boat
Division
The stipulated issue is:

What disposition shall be made of grievance
No. MTC 234-89 dated August 15, 1989?
A hearing was held in Groton, Connecticut on November 20,
1989 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record of the
hearing was taken; the Union made oral summation at the end of
the hearing, and subsequently, the Company submitted a post-hearing brief.
The grievance reads:
The Metal Trades Council of New London
County AFL-CIO charges the Electric Boat
Division of General Dynamics with violating Article XXX and any other related provisions of the current labor agreement.
The Union contends that the Employer has
made a farce of the subcontracting meetings
by failing to meet its contractual obligation. Prior to letting such contracts the
Union must be comprehensively informed of
what work the Company intends to contract.
The Union demands that the Employer cease
and desist.
Signed: Joseph W. Messier, President
Based on the record before me I have concluded that I am
unable to decide and that there is not a justiciable issue on

-2whether the Company has or has not complied with Article XXX and
other related contract provisions or with prior arbitration decisions regarding what information it has given or must give to the
Union prior to and when it plans to subcontract work, until the
Union cites a specific instance(s) when the Company did not do
what the Union asserts is required.
In the instant case, the Union cites no specific subcontract
ing situations. Rather it claims generally, that in many but unspecified circumstances, the Company did not or refused to provide
the Union with the "comprehensive" information about the proposed
subcontracting as required by the contract and prior arbitration
decisions. The Company denies the general accusation, and also
argues that it need only provide information that is relevant to
that particular subcontracting situation. However, until a specific case is cited, so that the facts thereof can be adjudicated
and considered by the Arbitrator, I do not see how I can decide
first, whether the Company did, or did not, provide all the inform
ation the Union sought, and second, whether if it did not, it was
required to do so. The Union's general assertion, without specific examples that the Company failed to use or complete a Union
generated questionnaire which the Union asked the Company to use
and complete in providing the information requested or required,
does not, standing alone, without a particular case(s) as the
focal point, mean that the Company has failed to comply with its
contractual obligations. In short, if the Union cannot tell me
specifically where the questionnaire was ignored or where incomplete information was provided, I fail to see how I can rule
meaningfully that the Company did not do so.
I see no reason why I would not agree with the prior arbitra
tion decisions which the Union cited. Indeed, I have no trouble
affirming the rulings of those decisions, and I do so herein. The
problem is that absent specific claimed cited violations of those
decisions, I am not in a position to affirm their applicability to
a subsequent set of facts or situations, or to hold one way or

-3the other that they were or were not adhered to by the Company.
A reading of the transcript in this case discloses the lack
of specificity in the Union's case.

The testimony on pages 23

through 27 show the inconclusiveness of the Union's complaint
as it applies to actual subcontracting situations. Consider the
following questions on cross-examination by Company counsel, and
the answers of the Union's chief witness:
Q. To your knowledge is that question being
responded to or answered by the Company?
A. I believe it is.
Q. Okay. With respect to manpower, it says
"Do the affected titles of people on
layoff", is that question being answered
by the Company, do you know?
A. I'm not really sure because although I've
skimmed through some sheets, I haven't, I
don't have clear in mind exactly which ones
were at this point.
Q. Okay. Do you know if justification is normally given by the Company for the decision
to subcontract?
A. Scheduling, and sometimes scheduling and
manpower.
Q. Is that the majority of cases are iustified
on that basis?
A. I believe that's true, although, like I said,
I haven't scrutinized all of them.
Q. Okay. Now, look at the second one where it
says "If yes, has the Company recalled any
employees?" Do you know if the Company is
responding to that question?
A. I really can't say.
Q. You don't know?
A. How about the next one, "If none are being
recalled, why not?" Do you know if the
Company is responding to those questions?

-4A. I could, I think, produce an example of a
recent meeting to show the answers to that,
but off the top of my head I couldn't.
Q. Off the top of my head

—

A. I can't get into any specifics, I'd be
guessing.
Q. Okay. Well, let me put it to you this way.
Of these questions that you've made up for
this sheet that have been propounded to the
Company Committee, do you know which ones
haven't been answered?
A. I think under cost, we've had trouble getting
answers on that.
Q. On either of one of —
A. Particularly the second one.
Q. Okay. So "what is the total for the intended subcontract?", do you know whether you
get that information or not?
A. Sometimes we will get an estimated figure.
Q. So you get something on the first one?
A. I have seen figures in that one, I remember
seeing that.
Q. Okay. So the second one says, "What is the
total for labor only?" Do you get that one?
A. No.
Q. Is that the one that's causing the problem
primarily?
A. That's one of them.
Q. Okay. How about equipment, do you have any
problem in the equipment section?
A. I believe so. I don't know that equipment
is always a factor but —
Q. I mean, to the extent that the Company sayas
"We don't have an X, Y, Z piece of equipment
and therefore we have to subcontract-out the
job." Are they refusing, to your knowledge
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to give you information to clarify the
justification for that kind of decision?
A. I'd rather not tory to guess at the answer,
I don't know.
Q. You don't know?
A. No.
Q. These questions on scheduling, do you know
whether the start times are given, the start
work dates?
A. I think I have seen in some instances that
it's just estimates.
Q. Okay. But there's not a refusal to respond
to the question?
A. There may be in some instances.
I think we
could provide you with an example to answer
these questions.
Q. Would the same thing be true for the second
one?
A. I believe we do get dates on the second one.
Q. Okay.
A. Or estimated dates.
Q. Any other other ones in this category that
cause you a problem?
A. I don't believe we get the breakdown how
many man hours are involved and the job per
title; how many man hours are in the backlog
for each affected title, if the Company is
taking action to reduce the backlog aside
from sub-contracting.
Q. So it's those last three?
A. That's part of the problem.
Q. And the cost problem that you indicated
earlier?
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A. Um-hum.
Q. And then maybe some problems with the
rental equipment?
A. Um-hum.
Q. And you haven't attended one of these
meetings since when?
A. A long time; not in the last ten years.
The testimony of the other Union witness added no probative
specificity to the Union's grievance.
What I am saying in short, is that I cannot do arbitral
justice to the positions of either side without the facts of a
specific subcontracting incident(s) before me as the focal point.
Without that I cannot say conclusively that the Company did not
give the Union all the information the Union sought and claimed
it was entitled to, let alone decide whether the Company's obligation is limited to what the Company claims is relevant to any
particular subcontracting decision.
The Union has cited and introduced into evidence several
arbitration decisions which it says supports its position. Though
as I have stated, I see no basis upon which I would consider overturning those decisions, and as I also stated, I affirm them herein, what remains "up in the air" is their applicability to the
undefined complains of the Union in the instant proceeding.

I

note significantly, that each of those cases dealt with specific
subcontracting situations. Arbitrator Seitz' case involved "subcontracting the drilling of holes in the floor of Building 401 and
the resurfacing of the floor of that building."

Arbitrator Healy 1

decision dealt with "Industrial Radiography or Non-Destructive
Testing." Arbitrator Reel's cases involved "contracting out certain dismantling work in a storage facility," and the subcontracting of "the re-badging process." Arbitrator Schmidt's matter concerned subcontracting "the pollution control excavation and paving
work undertaken

in the vicinity of the "Big Dish building."
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And Arbitrator Hoban considered the use of a subcontractor "to
blast and spray 263 pontoons."
In the instant case before me I do not know yet on or to
what subcontracted work the Union's complaint(s) are founded or
directed.
Accordingly, I have decided to return this matter to the
parties for further discussions, and with a direction to the Union
to specify to the Company those subcontracting situations about
which the Union claims inadequate information was provided it,
and to identify what or which information it claims it was denied
or not given. This direction is without prejudice to the respective positions of the parties on their rights and obligations in
subcontracting situations.
If agreeable to both sides, I shall retain jurisdiction in
this matter for a reasonable time, for a re-opening and for further
proceedings if and when the Union has given the Company and is
prepared to present to me complaints of specific subcontracting
incidents that violated the contract and/or the prior arbitration
decisions cited.

Absent mutual agreement on my retention of juris

diction, such specific complaints by the Union would be subject
to the regular grievance and arbitration provisions of the
contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 3, 1990
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) S o > I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
x

IGNATIUS GENTILE
A

FMCS

(10-Day Suspension)

W

A

R

D

Case No. 89-01493
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in
the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the parties therein, makes the following AWARD:
The* 10-day suspension of Ignatius Gentile
was not taken for just and sufficient cause
in accordance with Article 31-H(1) of the
negotiated agreement.
9
The 10-day suspension of Ignatius Gentile is
reversed and set aside.
Employer is ordered to make Mr. Gentile whole with
respect to any and all monetary losses and the
impairment of any other rights, including but not
limited to sick leave, vacation time, pension
rights, time in grade and seniority, which
resulted from the 10-day suspension.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 30, 1990
STATE of New York
)
) ss. :

COUNTY of New York

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
X

ARBITRATOR'S OPINION

IGNATIUS GENTILE

FMCS Case No. 89-01493

(10-Day Suspension)

The undersigned was appointed to arbitrate the captioned
to

matter pursuant to the December 15, 1987 Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Employer, and the American Federation of Government Employees
(National Immigration and Naturalization Service Council), the
Union. The stipulated issue is:
»
Was the 10-day suspension of Ignatius Gentile taken for
just and sufficient cause in accordance with Article
31-H(1) of the negotiated agreement, and if not, what
shall the remedy be?
Hearings were held on March 31, 1989, and January 17, 1990,
at which time Mr. Ignatius Gentile, the grievant, and the Union
and the Employer were given full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
stenographic record was taken.

A

Neither party elected to submit

post-hearing briefs.
I.

Procedural background.
On November 27, 1987, Mr. Robert Murray served as

Supervisory Deportation Officer in the New York District Office,
Deportation and Detention Branch, Immigration and Naturalization

1

Service.

On the same day, Mr. Ignatius Gentile, a Deportation

Officer employed by the Employer since 1971 and the grievant in
this proceeding, was assigned as Bond Officer in the New York
District Office.

Mr. Murray requested that the Employer take

disciplinary action based on Mr. Gentile's alleged misconduct on
November 27, 1987.

In a letter dated March 1, 1988, the Acting

Deputy District Director advised Mr. Gentile that he had
concluded that a proposal of adverse action against him was
warranted and proposed that such action consist of 30 days
suspension without pay or some lesser action.

The March 1 letter

contained four reasons and six specifications for the proposed
action: Reason I,

dereliction of duty (two specifications);

Reason II, misstatement of fact to a supervisor and co-worker
(two specifications); Reason III, refusal to answer a
supervisor's question (one specification); and Reason IV, use of
insulting, abusive and obscene language to a supervisor (one
specification).

Mr. Gentile responded to the allegations and the

proposal of adverse action.
After investigation, including consideration of Mr.
Gentile's responses to the charges, the Employer acting through
the District Director concluded:
1. there had been a failure to sustain Specifications 1 and
2 for Reason I1 and Specification 2 for Reason II2;
1
Specification 1 of Reason I (dereliction of duty) charged
that "Mr. Gentile was derelict in his duty by failing to properly
arrange for the release on bond of an alien in Service custody,
resulting in the alien's unnecessary and prolonged detention."

2. Specification 1 for Reason II and each specification for
Reasons III and IV had been sustained;
3. disciplinary action was warranted; and
4. Mr. Gentile should be suspended for ten days without pay.
Mr. Gentile elected to appeal the Employer's decision by
invoking the arbitration procedures under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.

This is the arbitration proceeding

pursuant to Article 31(J) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
II.

The administratively sustained Reasons and Specifications.
The following are the Specifications and Reasons sustained

The Chief, General Investigations, in his report to the District
Director reported that there was "insufficient evidence to prove
that Mr. Gentile was deliberate in his failure to contact Chula
Vista", where the alien was detainee*.
Specification 2 for Reason I charged that "Mr. Gentile
failed to complete the date of birth information on bond
worksheets relating to four detained aliens." The report of the
Chief, General Investigations, was that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that the failure to obtain the date of birth
information was deliberate.

2 Specification 2 for Reason II (misstatement of fact to a
supervisor or co-worker), in substance, charged that Mr. Gentile
had misstated to Mr. Murray the reason for his failure to obtain
date of birth information with respect to four bond worksheets by
allegedly falsely claiming the information came from "detention
cards" in El Paso when the information actually came from 1-213
forms in El Paso. Mr. Gentile in his response denied he had ever
said anything about detention cards and that he had accurately
reported that he had been advised by El Paso that the information
he sought had been lost at the time he called El Paso. The
Chief, General Investigations, report concluded there was
"insufficient evidence on which to support the charge" and the
fact that Mr. Murray obtained the information later that day did
not establish it was available when Mr. Gentile made the inquiry
of El Paso.

by the Employer for which the 10 days suspension without pay was
imposed:
Reason II

Misstatement of Fact to a Supervisor and CoWorker

Specification 1
It is charged that Mr. Gentile instructed Deportation and
Parole Clerk Roselle Wright to complete a bond substituting
her own date of birth for the missing information.3
Reason III

Refusal to Answer a Supervisor's Question

Specification 1
It is charged that Mr. Gentile, when asked by Mr. Murray why
he had failed to call-in the surety bond to Chula Vista as
previously instructed, responded that, "I have a reason, but

3 The report of the Chief, General Investigations, to the
District Director contains a synposis of the grievant's response
(according to the investigator) and the investigator's
conclusion. The responses and the conclusions with respect to
each administratively sustained specification and reason appear
in this and the following two footnotes.

Response (Specification 1, Reason II)
Mr. Gentile stated that his instruction to Ms. Wright was,
in fact, a suggestion to overcome the fact that the aliens'
dates of birth were unavailable; and that the suggestion
came after Ms. Wright refused to heed Mr. Gentile's previous
suggestion which was that she substitute "00/00/00" for the
missing information.
Conclusion
I conclude that Mr. Gentile Misstated a Fact to a Co-Worker.
A bond is an official government document; to knowingly
cause it to be completed containing false information is
improper. Nothing in Mr. Gentile's response satisfactorily
explains his behavior.

I'm not telling you."4
Reason IV

Use of Insulting, Abusive and Obscene Language to
a Supervisor

Specification 1
It is charged that Mr. Gentile stated to Mr. Murray, "Go
ahead and write me up. I'll beat you and you know I'll beat
you, because this Agency is run by assholes."^
III.

The evidence at the hearing.
A.

General.

At the arbitration hearing, the Employer called one witness,
Mr. Robert Murray.

The Union called Mr. Gentile and Deportation

Response
Mr. Gentile denies that he refused to answer Mr. Murray's
question, and further states that he made several attempts
to arrange for the release of Mr. Wu on bond.
Conclusion
There is an absence of corroboration on the part of either
party with respect to this event. I must conclude that Mr.
Murray factually reported that which was said to him by Mr.
Gentile. It is obvious that the maintenance of order,
discipline and efficiency of the affairs of this
organization must depend in part upon recognition of the
authority of its supervisors. Mr. Gentile's refusal to
answer a proper question placed to him by a supervisor must
be interpreted as a refusal to acknowledge and cooperate
with those factors on which the organization must function.
5

Response

Mr. Gentile denies that he made such a statement.
Conclusion
In the absence of corroboration on the part of either party
in this instance, I must conclude that Mr. Murray factually
reported that which was said to him by Mr. Gentile. Such
language cannot be tolerated.

Officers Dwyer, McGuiness and Bieber.

The Union also called Mr.

Joseph Occhipinti, Supervising Special Agent and Chief of the
Anti-Smuggling Unit in the New York District office, a member of
management.

Mr. Charles J. Murphy also was called by the Union.

He is a Special Agent for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the President of the National Immigration and
Naturalization Service Council.

The Council, part of the Union,

consists of 37 local unions which represent the Employer's
employees around the country.
The entire administrative record concerning the charges was
received as a Joint Exhibit.

This included: Mr. Murray's request

for disciplinary action; the Deputy Director's proposal for
adverse action; the grievant's response to the charges;
affidavits and other supporting documents; the report of the
Chief, General Investigations, to the District Director,
including his conclusions and recommendations; and the decision
of the District Director which constitutes the decision of the
Employer.
B.

On November 27, 1987, Mr. Murray was on duty as

supervisor in the Employer's New York District Office, and Mr.
Gentile, a deportation officer, was on duty during a shift that
ended at 4:00 P.M.

At Mr. Gentile's request, Mr. Murray assigned

Mr. Gentile to serve as Bond Officer in lieu of having him go out
in the field, because Mr. Gentile had just returned from sick
leave.

The function of the Bond Officer is to process the paper
work for a bond that an obligor will post to accomplish the
release of a detained alien who is entitled to be released
pursuant to court order.

In the ordinary course, the potential

bond obligor supplies information on a worksheet which the Bond
Officer has the duty to verify and, when appropriate, to make
additions and corrections.

Often, information is obtained from

the place where the alien is detained (e.g., Chula Vista,
California, or El Paso, Texas).
Sometime between 9:00 A.M. and 10:00 A.M. on November 27,
Mr. Murray assigned Mr. Gentile the task of completing the paper
work on a bond for a Mr. Wu, an alien then being held in Chula
Vista detention center in Southern California.

Mr. Murray had

had possession of the bond for about 40 hours (since November
25), but he told nothing about this to Mr. Gentile.

It appears

that Mr. Gentile made several calls during the day in order to
obtain information concerning Mr. Wu, but apparently the
telephones were not being answered in Chula Vista.

Another

deportation officer testified that Mr. Gentile had been trying to
make contact throughout the day and that it was not uncommon for
it to be difficult to make telephone contact with Chula Vista.
In order to complete the worksheet and the bond, Mr. Gentile
wanted to obtain Wu's date of birth but was unable to do so.
Mr. Murray testified that towards the end of the day on
November 27, 1987, he overheard a conversation bewteen Mr.

Gentile and Ms. Roselle Wright concerning the preparation of the
bond she was typing which was to be posted for the release of Mr.
Wu.

Mr. Murray stated that Mr. Gentile told Ms. Wright, who was

completing the forms, to put her birthdate on the form being
prepared for the Wu bond because he did not have Mr. Wu's date of
birth.
Mr. Murray testified that the date of birth was a material
fact in the issuance of a bond and in any event it violated the
law and Employer policy to enter false statements about a date of
birth in the record. He also expressed concern that the obligor
on the bond might be able to avoid liability if the date of birth
was incorrect.

Mr. Murray denied any knowledge of a policy or

practice which would permit knowingly recording an incorrect date
of birth.
Mr. Gentile did not deny that he made a statement to Ms.
Wright substantially similar to the one Mr. Murray reported.
Indeed, he believed the statements were made not only in
connection with the Wu bond, but probably with respect to other
bonds as well, particularly those involving several aliens whose
information has to be obtained from El Paso where there was some
trouble at the time which prevented him from obtaining some
information.
However, Mr. Gentile (and the Union) claimed that the
statement was reported by Mr. Murray out of context and that the
suggestion to Ms. Wright was consistent with accepted practice.
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Mr. Gentile admitted that he made the request of Ms. Wright after
he had advised her that he did not have the alien's birthdate and
after having initially told her to enter 000 000 as the alien's
birthdate which Ms. Wright said she unwilling to do.
Mr. Gentile claimed that his sole purpose was to obtain the
release of the aliens expeditiously and that he had found it
impossible to obtain the aliens' birthdates from the Chula Vista,
California detention center and from El Paso.

However, he did

have all of the information necessary to identify the aliens as
the ones entitled to release on the bonds, i.e., he had the "A"
number and the alien's name.

The "A" number was a certain method

of identification, according to Gentile and other witnesses,
because each alien was assigned a different "A" number, and with
the number and the name or date of birth or perhaps even the
nationality, the identity of the alien as the one entitled to
release on bond could be confidently established.

Gentile and

others testified that it was common practice when a date of birth
could not be obtained and the identity of the alien had been
established by reference to the "A" number and the alien's name,
to enter a fictitious birthdate in order to complete the record
and permit access to the computer.

The Union presented testimony

of other agents and introduced several Employer computergenerated documents which showed that the use of a fictitious
birthdate (e.g., 0101010) was commonplace.
Moreover, when finally completed (after Mr. Gentile had left

for the day but during Mr. Murray's tour) the documents for the
alien involved with the request to Ms. Wright showed different
birthdates on the bond and on the worksheet.

One of the dates of

birth was that of a secretary (not Ms. Wright) who had typed the
bond.

The alien was released based upon those documents.

Ms. Wright was not called as a witness by either side.

Two

written statements by her (which were part of the prior
administrative investigation), were offered and received in
evidence without objection.

One statement, obtained by the

Employer, affirms that the specific request was made by Mr.
Gentile.

The other statement, obtained by the Union, states Ms.

Wright's conclusion that Mr. Gentile's acted only with the
purpose to comply with the goal of obtaining the expeditious
•
release of the alien involved and he had not asked her to do
anything improper.

Neither statement goes much beyond the bare

statements reported in this paragraph.
In addition to the conversation with Ms. Wright, Mr. Murray
testified that at about 4:00 P.M. he asked Mr. Gentile why he had
not made contact with Chula Vista.

According to Mr. Murray, Mr

Gentile replied, "I have a reason, but I'm not telling you ."
Mr. Gentile followed up this remark, according to Mr. Murray, by
telling Mr. Murray "that I [Murray] could write him [Gentile] up
and that if I wrote him up that—his word was, I will beat you,
you know I'll beat you, this agency's run be assholes."

Mr.

Gentile categorically denied that he made any of the statements
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and characterized Mr. Murray's version as "pure lies".

In this

connection, Mr. McGuiness, a deportation officer, was present
with the other two gentlemen in and around Mr. McGuiness1 office
at about 4:00 P.M. and he heard and saw nothing which indicated
that there had been any unpleasantness between Mr. Murray and Mr.
Gentile.
There also was Union evidence concerning an alleged
conspiracy on the part of some members of management to
intimidate, retaliate against and destroy the Union by oppressing
its officers and members.

This evidence consisted of the

opinions of employees based on their observations and the claim
that an unusual number of union""1 officers and shop stewards had
been subjected to disciplinary actions.

In addition, the Union

sought to cast doubt on Mr. Murray's credibility and motivation
by extensive inquiry into the manner in which the charges against
Mr. Gentile were brought, claiming that the charges were brought
with so little if any investigation that several were
administratively dismissed.

In this connection there was strong

corroborative evidence in support of Mr. Gentile's version of the
events concerning those dismissed charges which are described in
notes 1 and 2 of this opinion.
IV.

Discussion.
The Employer has the burden of establishing by clear and

convincing evidence that there was just and sufficient cause for
disciplining Mr. Gentile.

With respect to Reason II,

Specification 1 (Misstatement of Fact to a Supervisor and Coll

worker), it is conceded that Mr. Gentile told Ms. Wright to enter
her own date of birth on the form or forms in question which,
literally, would have been a misstatement of fact.

In support of

the Employer's position that this conduct provides just and
sufficient cause for disciplinary action, the Employer relies on
the fact of falsity alone as well as Mr. Murray's testimony that
he was unaware of any practice which would render such conduct
acceptable and, in effect, his denial that there was such a
practice.

Moreover, Mr. Murray stated his belief that it was

wrongful conduct because it constituted a violation of the law
and because it might impair the government's claim on the bond.
Further support for the Employer's position might be found
in Ms. Wright's refusal to comply with any of Mr. Gentile's
requests.

Her refusals possibly could cast doubt on how well-

accepted or well-known was the practice of entering fictitious
dates of birth.

However, these doubts without resolution by

testimony from Ms. Wright remain as speculations, because Ms.
Wright was not a witness.
The Union's evidence on Specification 1, Reason II, consisted
of Mr. Gentile's testimony concerning the circumstances
surrounding the request to Ms. Wright, his and the testimony of
others supported by Employer computer-generated documents
concerning an apparently common practice of using fictitious
dates of birth where identity had been established by other
information in order to expedite the release of an alien.
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In

substance, there was significant evidence of record that Mr.
Gentile, after having identified the aliens who were entitled to
be released, acted in accordance with common office practice to
accomplish their release expeditiously.

Moreover, there was no

evidence that the literal "misstatement" was to be made for the
purpose or with the contemplated effect of misleading anyone.
Indeed, the Employer's own computer records demonstrate that such
"misstatements" are not treated by the Employer as a
representation of fact.

The request or advice to Ms. Wright

simply was a method utilised to avoid unnecessary delay, a
method which the evidence indicates apparently was known to the
Employer whether or not Mr. Murray's claimed ignorance of the
practice is credited.

On this record, I find that the Employer

has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
conduct charged provides just and sufficient cause for
disciplining Mr. Gentile.
The specifications for Reasons III and IV involve simply
diametrically opposite versions by Mr. Murray and'Mr. Gentile.

I

agree with the Employer's Chief of General Investigations
concerning the absence of corroboration of either side's version
(see notes 4 and 5, above).

However, I am constrained also to

find that the Employer has not sustained its burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the words were
spoken and that there was just and sufficient cause for
disciplining Mr. Gentile on the basis of these last two
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charges.6
V.

Conclusion.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the Employer failed

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that there was just
and sufficient cause for the 10-day suspension of Ignatius
Gentile or for taking any disciplinary action against him on the
grounds charged in Specification 1, Reason II or in
Specification 1, Reason III, or in Specification 1, Reason IV.
Consequently, the Employer's determination that Mr. Gentile be
suspended for ten days without pay is reversed and set aside and
it is further determined that Mr. Gentile should be made whole
with respect to any loss of money or other rights and privileges
which he has lost be virtue of the suspension.

DATED: March 30, 1990
ERIC J. SCHMERTZ
Arbitrator

6 In view of the conclusions reached in this opinion, the
issue of conspiracy to destroy the union and Mr. Murray's
credibility insofar as it is related to the alleged conspiracy
need not be resolved in this proceeding.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in
the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the parties therein, makes the following AWARD:
The 10-day suspension of Ignatius Gentile
was not taken for just and sufficient cause
in accordance with Article 31-H(1) of the
negotiated agreement.
The 10-day suspension of Ignatius Gentile is
reversed and set aside.
Employer is ordered to make Mr. Gentile whole with
respect to any and all monetary losses and the
impairment of any other rights, including but not
limited to sick leave, vacation time, pension
rights, time in grade and seniority, which
resulted from the 10-day suspension.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March 30, 1990
STATE of New York
)
) ss. :
COUNTY of New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The New York Professional
Nurses Union

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #13 300 00590 91

and
Lenox Hill Hospital

The issue is what shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance of March 22, 1991, Numbered 91-4?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration
Association on September 16, 1991 at which time representatives of
the above-named Union and Hospital appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The Union's grievance reads:
The Hospital has violated the collective bargaining agreement, including but not limited
to Article XIV Section 8 by denying orientation differential.
The remedy requested is:
Ms. Gotkin shall be made whole in every way
including but not limited to payment of
orientation differential.
Article XIV Section 8 of the current and applicable collective bargaining agreement reads:
Employees who orient RN's and LPN's shall
receive a differential of one (1) hour of
her/his regular pay for each seven and
one-half (7%) hour shift (pro-rated for
shifts in excess of seven and one-half (7%
hours) for which he/she works in such
capacity or one and one-half (1%) hours

-2of his/her regular pay if there is more
than one orientee.
From September 1987 to February 1991 the grievant, Clary
Gotkin was Head Nurse in cardiac surgery (open-heart
the Hospital's operating room.

surgery) in

In February, 1991 she transferred

to Staff Nurse, still in cardiac surgery.

She, and the Union on

her behalf, claim that over several days in February, March,
August and September, 1991 she "oriented" nurses who rotated into
cardiac surgery from other surgical departments of the operating
room and that this "orientation" was within the meaning and intent
of Article XIV Section 8 of the contract.

The nurses she claims

she "oriented" were experienced nurses from other surgical departments who had not previously served in cardiac surgery.

The

Union asserts that those nurses need instructions and familiarization with the cardiac surgery nursing methods and procedures
and equipment, and the grievant "taught" those things to them.
The program the grievant claims she taught those nurses is set
forth in a three page document entitled "Operating Room Nursing
Cardiovascular Rotation (Union Exhibit #4).

The introductory

paragraph of Exhibit #4 reads:
You are expected to demonstrate your understanding of cardiothoracic surgery and the
special needs of the patients undergoing
this surgery. This means that the areas of
invasive monitoring, hemodynamics, blood
gases, cardiac and pulmonary functions and
cardiac drugs are no longer just words to
you. You are not expected to thoroughly
comprehend these aspects, but your demonstrated interest should be observed.
The second paragraph introduces "areas of basic competency
with which nurses entering cardiac surgery are to become familiar
during [the] rotation" and upon which they "will be evaluated."

-3The "goal sought"
independently

is "for the staff member to be able to function

in both scrub and circulating roles in routine and

emergency situations."

The headings of "Area(s) of Competency"

are :
1. Use of Area Resources
2. Knowledge and Demonstration of Use of
Area Supplies
3. Demonstration of Proper Care, Handling,
and Packaging
4. Preparation of the operating room for
Cardiac/Pacemaker surgery
5. Demonstration of Use of Details Specific
to the Reception of and Preparation for
the cardiac patient
6. Demonstration of Awareness of Nursing
Responsibility During Cardiac/Pacemaker
surgery
7. Demonstration of Working Knowledge of
Cardiac Anatomy and Circulation
8. Demonstration of Knowledge of Open Heart
Procedures.. .
9. Anticipation of Surgeon's Needs During
Routine and Common Emergency Procedures...
10.Evidence of a collegial Supportive
Attitude toward Team Members...
11.Verbalization of Understanding Basic
Instruction given...
The grievant testified that it was the foregoing instructiona
program which she followed for nurses who rotated into cardiac
surgery from other surgical departments of the operating room on
the dates for which the differential is claimed.
The Hospital does not dispute the grievant's basic claim that
she provided instruction and familiarization to these nurses.
Rather it asserts that Article XIV Section 8 of the contract does
not apply to that work; does riot apply to experienced nurses who
rotate among the various surgical departments of the operating
room; but is limited to "new nurses" upon their entering into the
Hospital and during their probationary period of employment.

The

-4"orientation" referred to in Article XIV Section 8 argues the
Hospital, is institutionalized in a "Preceptor Program." (Hospital
Exhib B3).

In written form it is a 56 page document with subject

matter divided into two parts, as follows:
Part I
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Purpose of the program and
Role of the Clinical Preceptor
Guidelines for selection of Clinical
Preceptors
Guidelines for the implemention of the
Clinical Preceptor's responsibilities
The Role of the Supervisor
The Role of the Inservice Instructor

Part II
1.
2.
3.
4.

Evaluation form of new staff member
Evaluation form of Clinical Preceptor
and Program
Evaluation form of Clinical Preceptor
Knowledge and Skill Reference Record

The Hospital contends that to "orient RN's and PLN's within
the meaning and intent of Article XIV Section 8, is to put these
nurses through that Preceptor Program.

And that nurses who give

that orientation are the only ones entitled to the contractual
differential set forth in that contract clause.
It is stipulated that "new" or "probationary" nurses are not
assigned to cardiac surgery.

Nurses so assigned are experienced

from service in other surgery departments of the operating room;
are beyond their probationary period; are not "new" to the
Hospital; but have not previously served in cardiac surgery.
The Hospital draws a sharp distinction between the Preceptor
Program and the Operating Room Nursing Cardiovascular Rotation.
It claims that because nurses rotating into cardiac surgery are ex
perienced in general surgery they know about much of the equipment

-5and techniques used from their experience in other surgery disciplines, and that they need only rudimentary familiarization with
the procedures of cardiac surgery.

That familiarization argues

the Hospital, is not to "orient" within the meaning and negotiated
intent of Article XIV Section 8.
The Union and the Hospital contend that the language of
Article XIV Section 8; the "legislative history" of that clause,
and past practice support their respective, but difference
postions.
As the parties well know, past practice contrary to clear
contract language does not change or alter the contract.
the contract language prevails.

Rather

Similarly, and for the same

reasons, arbitrators resort to evidence of past practice only if
the contract language is unclear, ambiguous or not reasonably
susceptible to a determinative and conclusive interpretation. Here
I find that the contract language is not so unclear or ambiguous
as to foreclose a reasonable and determinative interpretation.
It is well settled that when the parties use an ordinary
word in their contract, without any special definition of that
word, it should be interpreted consistent with its ordinary and
common usage and meaning.

Webster's Dictionary provides the

following relevant definition for the word

"orient":

"to acquaint with an existing situation
or environment"
The dictionary definition of "orient" appears to be what even
the Hospital concedes the grievant did with the rotated nurses in
cardiac surgery.

As "orient" is synonymous with "acquaint" it is

less educationally demanding than "to teach."

It presupposes a

-6basic or fundamental knowledge of the discipline (like surgery
nursing) and that only some guidance and direction are needed to
bring those known skills and experience to bear on the special
work at hand.

Based on the record, that at least is what the

grievant did.

She may not have taught basic skills, and she may

not have had to deal with new and inexperienced nurses and teach
them fundamentals of surgery nursing, but she had to "familiarize"
them or "acquaint" them with the cardiac surgery service.

In that

regard therefore what she did pursuant to Union Exhibit #4, and
the ordinary, critical language of Article XIV Section 8, are
consistent.

Indeed, the contract language makes no distinction

among RNs and LPNs who may be "oriented."

Had a distinction been

intended between new and experienced nurses, it would have been
easy for that distinction to have been made, in simple contract
language,

as part of Article XIV Section 8.

A look at the negotiation history of Article XIV Section 8
gives further interpretative clarification and negates any conclusion that it is unclear or ambiguous.
The Hospital points out that the Union tried to get the
orientation differential extended to students and clerks, but
failed.

It argues that the Union did not seek to "extend" it to

experienced nurses at that time and that because any such extension was not sought

or even contemplated, the Union should not

now be allowed to achieve by arbitration what it failed to obtain
in negotiations.
But the Hospital apparently overlooks what changes the Union
did achieve in earlier negotiations, leading to the current contract clause.

Significant to my mind is the change from the
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1985-1987 contract between these parties.

That earlier clause

read in pertinent part:
Orientation of Registered Nurses is part
of the Staff RN's job. Employees who
are assigned by the Employer to "new RN
orientation" shall receive a differential....
(emphasis added).
In the 1988-89 contract, the Union obtained an extension of
coverage from RNs to "RNs and LPNs" and elimination of the statement that "orientation is part of a staff RN's job."

Though it

did not get further extensions to cover students and clerks, it
did gain deletion of the phrase "assigned by the Employer to new
RN orientations."

The clause read in pertinent part"

Employees who are assigned by the Employer
to orient RNs and LPNs shall receive a
differential....
The deletion of the earlier reference to "new RN orientation"
is clearly significant.

To my mind it means that until 1988,

orientation was confined to new, probationary nurses.

But once

deleted and absent any other explanation, the meaning of the
clause changed.

A bare reading, juxtaposed with its history,

leaves only one logical conclusion.

And that is that though the

Union did not gain an extension of coverage to "students and
clerks," it gained coverage of orientation to experienced nurses
as well as new nurses.

The Hospital's argument that failure to

cover "students or clerks" means that no enlargement of coverage
was obtained, does not logically follow.

The Union sought but did

not get coverage for two classifications of employees who were not
nurses.

But an explicit expansion of the nurse category to includ
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experienced nurses was not necessary, because it was obtained
with the deletion of the "limitation to new RNs."
The current contract language is further supportive of the
above conclusion.

The essential language of the current Section

8 of Article XIV not only tracks the 1988-1989 language covering
orientation of RNs and LPNs, but makes it applicable to circumstances when "employees.... orient RNs and LPNs."
conditions that orientation on its "assignment

It no longer

by the Employer."

The elimination of the "assignment" condition is further evidence
of a relaxation of Employer control and earlier limitations on
who orients and who is being oriented.

In short, the contract

changes over the years read together, compel the conclusion that
the ordinary, current language of Section 8 covers as "orientation" the "acquainting"

or "familiarization" of experienced RNs

and LPNs who enter the cardiac surgery service on rotation from
other departments.

At the very least, I am persuaded that the

grievant did that work as evidenced by Union Exhibit #4, and is
entitled to the differential.
That the past practice may have been different, is immaterial
Even that is not clear in the record.

The Union points to five

instances where it says the orientation differential was paid
to a staff nurse who "oriented" experienced,
nurses.

non-probationary

The Hospital replies that three of those were "mistakes"

and two were paid for "other procedures," but mislabeled as an
"orientation differential."

However these explanations were just

that - bare statements by a Hospital witness.

No hard evidence
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was introduced to show conclusively that three "mistakes" were
made and that twice, payments were mis-identified.

Nor do I

have adequate evidence of the magnitude, frequency and examples
of the rest of the practice on which the Hospital relies.
Because the record is unclear on which days the grievant in
fact performed services that constituted "orientation" within the
meaning of Article XIV Section 8 and this arbitration decision,
I shall make no ruling on what the Hospital owes the grievant for
the orientation differential.

I shall leave it to the parties to

examine the circumstances of the dates for which she claims the
differential, and to attempt to agree on the accuracy of the claim
and/or which qualify for the differential.

If the parties dis-

agree, they may by mutual agreement refer it back to me for
determination, or that dispute may be processed for arbitration
under the contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the
above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance dated March 22, 1991
and numbered 91~4 on behalf of Clary Gotkin,
is granted to the extent that her "orientation" of non-probationary nurses coming into the cardiac surgery department of the
operating room on rotation from other departments entitles her to an orientation differential under Article XIV Section 8 of the
contract.
Remanded to the parties is the determination
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of on which days and for which nurses
Ms. Gotkin performed orientation services. For those on which there is
agreement, the Hospital shall pay the
contractual differential to Ms. Gotkin.
Disagreements may be referred back to
me for determination upon mutual agreement by the parties. Otherwise, disagreements may be processed for arbitration before another arbitrator.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED October 15, 1991
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument.

